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Abstract 
This thesis comprises three empirical papers. Using various econometric 
techniques, each paper examines different aspects of human capital. These aspects 
vary from determinants of human capital to heterogeneity in human capital, and to 
non-economic benefit of human capital. The objective of this thesis is to obtain a 
better understanding about issues related human capital and education in 
developing countries, in particular Indonesia and Vietnam.  
The first research paper examines the role of parental academic aspirations 
for a child in determining the allocation of the child’s time. Parental academic 
aspirations are included in a theoretical model of household utility maximization to 
assess how they affect the child’s optimal time allocation. Then, an empirical 
analysis is conducted to verify the effect of parental aspirations on a child’s hours 
of study and work by using data from the 2006 and 2014 Vietnam Young Lives 
Survey. The instrumental variable approach is adopted to address a problem related 
to the simultaneity of decision making process and endogeneity of parental 
aspirations. Both the theoretical and empirical results show that parental academic 
aspirations are positively associated with the child’s hours of study and negatively 
associated with the child’s hours of work.  
The second research paper seeks to understand the reasons for the ethnic gaps 
in education outcomes, measured by enrolment rate, schooling progress and test 
scores, in Vietnam. The examination employs Probit and multilevel regression 
models, and associated decomposition techniques. The estimation results suggest 
that the factors mainly driving the poor performance at school of minority children 
are not their own internal attributes, but disadvantages related to the external 
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determinants. The decomposition results show that the gap in enrolment is mostly 
explained by household characteristics. However, all child, household and 
commune attributes significantly contribute to the gap in schooling progress. The 
test score gaps are attributable to a broader set of variables such as parent’s 
education, the use of the Vietnamese language, peer and school characteristics. 
The third paper identifies the causal effect of education on property crime at 
the district level in Indonesia over the period 2007–2012. Both dynamics of crime 
and endogeneity of education are taken into accounted by applying difference 
generalized method of moments. The results show that more educated 
neighbourhoods experience less crime. Secondary and higher education play a 
particularly important role in crime reduction. Effects are more pronounced for 
crimes reported by males than females. One mechanism seems to be that there are 
fewer opportunities for engaging in criminal behaviour when one is in school. 
Extreme poverty appears to weaken the extent to which education reduces crime. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
Human capital has been widely considered as a factor fuelling economic growth 
through increasing labour productivity. In many studies, human capital has been 
even recognized as an important determinant of the economic development level 
(Hanushek and Woessmann 2008; Gennaioli et al. 2012; Cinnirella and Streb 2017). 
Besides, non-economic benefits of human capital have also recently been 
acknowledged. Human capital helps to improve health outcomes (Silles 2009; 
Oreopoulos 2006; de Walque 2010; Grimard and Parent 2007), increases political 
and social participation (Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 2004; Dee 2004) and 
reduces risky behaviours, such as crime and teenage pregnancy (Bell, Costa, and 
Machin 2016; Berthelon and Kruger 2011; Lochner and Moretti 2004; Machin, 
Marie, and Vujić 2012; Cook and Kang 2016; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
2011). 
Human capital is broadly defined as individuals’ knowledge and skills, which 
are accumulated through education, training and working experience, as well as the 
innate ability. However, in most of the studies, human capital in a narrow definition 
is measured by education levels of people (Gennaioli et al. 2012; Acemoglu, 
Gallego, and Robinson 2014; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). In either a broad or 
narrow definition, human capital still concerns a wide range of issues, which cannot 
be thoroughly covered in a thesis. Therefore, this thesis focuses only on three 
specific issues related to human capital: the allocation of a child’s time, inequality 
in education, and the crime reducing effect of education. The aim of this thesis is to 
gain a better understanding about these three aspects of human capital in general, 
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and that in Indonesia and Vietnam in particular. Based on this understanding, the 
thesis proposes policy implications, which are relevant to the context of each 
country studied, to improve education outcomes and to facilitate the development 
of human capital. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction 
about the thesis. Chapter 2 details background on education in Indonesia and 
Vietnam. Using data from Vietnam, Chapter 3 examines the allocation of a child’s 
time between study and work by focusing on the role of parental academic 
aspirations. Chapter 4 investigates ethnic gaps in education outcomes among the 
young generation in Vietnam. Chapter 5 explores a non-economic benefit of 
education, crime reducing effect, in Indonesia. Chapter 6 concludes. 
1.1. Parental academic aspirations for a child and the allocation of a 
child’s time 
Since human capital is accumulated gradually through learning and working, the 
way children spend their time on studying, working and leisure directly affects their 
physical and mental health, their skills and knowledge, thus determines their human 
capital. In Chapter 3, the allocation of a child’s time between study and work is 
examined by emphasizing the role of parental academic aspirations for their child. 
Although a child’s time allocation has been investigated in association with a 
numbers of factors in the literature, most of them are socio-economic and 
demographic attributes. The connection between a child’s time allocation and 
psychological factors, such as aspirations and expectations, has not been seriously 
attended to, thus motivating the analysis conducted in Chapter 3. 
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In Chapter 3, parental academic aspirations are introduced in a theoretical 
model of household utility maximization to feature how they affect the optimal 
child’s time allocation. In this model, parental aspirations are considered as a factor 
augmenting the effectiveness of the child’s study time, which, in turn, increases the 
child’s human capital. Then an empirical analysis is conducted to verify the effect 
of parental aspirations on a child’s hours of study and work by using data from the 
2006 and 2014 Vietnam Young Lives Survey. To address the problems related to 
the simultaneity of decision making process and endogeneity of parental 
aspirations, the average local wage is used as an instrumental variable for 
aspirations. Both the theoretical and empirical results show that children, whose 
parents have high academic aspirations for, spend more time studying and less time 
doing economic work. A further analysis suggests that parental academic 
aspirations have no significant effect on the time doing housework for boys, but 
significantly reduce the workload for girls. Academic performance of a child is 
negatively associated with the number hours of work and positively associated with 
the time he or she spends studying. 
The consistent findings of the role of parental aspirations in determining a 
child’s studying and working time from both theoretical and empirical analyses 
suggest that the allocation of the child’s time is a missing link in the relationship 
between parental aspirations and the child’s academic achievements. Thus, future 
studies might consider the allocation of a child’s time as a channel among others, 
through which parental aspirations affect a child’s educational attainment.  
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1.2.  Ethnic gaps in education outcomes in Vietnam 
Chapter 4 focuses on the narrow definition of human capital, which is education. 
More specifically, the second research paper presented in Chapter 4 attempts to 
explain why education outcomes vary between children in non-Kinh minority and 
Kinh majority groups in Vietnam. Although the goal of a fair society has been set 
in Vietnam since independence in 1945, inequality including that in education is an 
obstacle to the country achieving its goal. For example, ethnic gaps in education 
exist in all education outcomes. Non-Kinh minority children lag far behind Kinh 
majority counterparts in enrolment rates, schooling progress and test scores. 
Therefore, identifying the key factors driving the gaps will not only help to narrow 
the gaps, but also to improve the education levels of people in the country and 
contribute to the development of a fairer society. That is also the aim of the research 
paper presented in Chapter 4. 
In particular, the paper explains the ethnic gaps in school enrolment, 
schooling progress and academic performance by using data from the 2009 Young 
Lives Survey and 2011-2012 Young Lives School Survey. The analysis employs 
Probit and multilevel regression models, and associated decomposition techniques. 
The estimation results suggest that the factors mainly driving the poor performance 
at school of minority children are not their own internal attributes, but 
disadvantages related to the external determinants. Poverty is still an obstacle to 
minority children obtaining high test scores. Education of the father, who is likely 
to be the decision maker in the family, significantly affects the enrolment status of 
the child, while education of the mother, who tends to spend more time with the 
child, is substantially important to the child schooling progress. The decomposition 
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results show that the key factors contributing to the gaps are different, depending 
on the type of education outcomes under examination. The gap in enrolment is 
mostly explained by household characteristics, of which father’s education and 
household economic conditions are particularly important. However, all child, 
household and commune attributes significantly contribute to the gap in schooling 
progress. The test score gaps are attributable to a broader set of variables such as 
parent’s education, the use of the Vietnamese language, peer and school 
characteristics.  
The findings related to the variation in the role of determinants suggest that 
efforts to narrow the ethnic gaps in education should vary the focus and priority 
according to the targeted outcomes. For example, improving household economic 
condition might be relevant to narrowing the enrolment and schooling progress 
gaps, but in order to equalize education performance across ethnic groups, 
removing the language barriers and improving school quality are crucial. 
1.3. The crime reducing impact of education in Indonesia  
Chapter 5 looks at a non-economic benefit of human capital: crime reducing effect. 
In this chapter, human capital is measured by education levels of people. Evidence 
of the crime reducing effect of education has been found in a number of developed 
countries, but the topic is studied in developing countries only in a limited manner, 
where law enforcement tends to be weaker, poverty higher and the average 
education level of the population lower. Indonesia is an interesting case because 
crime rates trend to decrease recently, despite limited capacity and insufficiency of 
the police force, and serious corruption in the justice system. Given a consistent 
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improvement in education levels of Indonesians over time, it is reasonable to ask 
whether education plays a role in the reduction of crime incidence in the country. 
More precisely, the chapter identifies the causal effect of education on 
property crime at the district level in Indonesia over the period 2007–2012. It 
establishes how the education level of people living in a district affects the 
incidence of property crime they have experienced. Hence, information on crime 
comes from self-reports of individuals who were victims of crime rather than from 
police or offender sources, which are likely to undercount the incidence of crime. 
Both dynamics of crime and endogeneity of education are taken into accounted by 
applying difference generalized method of moments. In addition, the paper 
examines the effect of education on crime in a developing country context This has 
been inadequately studied so far. The results show that more educated 
neighbourhoods experience less crime. Secondary and higher education play a 
particularly important role in crime reduction. Effects are more pronounced for 
crimes reported by males than females. One mechanism seems to be that there are 
fewer opportunities for engaging in criminal behaviour when one is in school. 
Extreme poverty appears to weaken the extent to which education reduces crime. 
The findings relating to the crime reducing impact of education (especially 
senior secondary education) in this paper provide an additional supporting reason 
for the implementation of compulsory senior secondary education in Indonesia, 
which was commenced recently. A key recommendation of this paper is that the 
non-pecuniary benefits of schooling, such as the crime reducing effect, should be 
taken into account in the policy making process, for example policies related to the 
expansion of compulsory education through senior secondary level. Additionally, 
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the government should consider educational improvement and poverty mitigation 
as possible solutions, apart from law enforcement, to crime. 
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2. Background  
2.1. Education in Indonesia 
With the population of over 260 million, Indonesia has the 4th largest education 
system in the world, following China, India, and the United States. At the pre-
tertiary level, there are 250 thousand schools, 50 million students, and 2.6 million 
teachers nationwide. The ratio of students to teachers in primary education is 18.6 
(OECD and ADB 2015). Basic education consists of primary, junior secondary and 
senior secondary level. Primary education in Indonesia includes 6 years of 
schooling, junior and senior secondary each spans 3 years (Cerdan-Infantes et al. 
2013). Public and private schools dominate in the education system, accounting for 
84 per cent of the total.  Private schools play an important role, especially in 
secondary education. Specifically, the share of private schools is 7 per cent at 
primary, 56 per cent at junior secondary and 67 per cent at senior secondary level. 
Islamic schools account for the remaining 16 per cent of basis education system.  
Ministry of Education and Culture has overall responsibility for managing public 
and private schools while the Ministry of Religion oversees Islamic schools (OECD 
and ADB 2015). 
Before 1979, the academic and calendar years were coincident. In 1979 the 
school year began to operate from July and run through June the following year. 
Students who started the school year in January of 1978 remained in the same grade 
until July of 1979 (Parinduri 2014). Government regulations deem that children 
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should start primary school at age seven, although some begin a year earlier or a 
year later (Barakat 2016).  
Prior to 2001 schools were managed by central government ministries and 
their geographically deconcentrated field offices. In 2001 Indonesia decentralized 
authority over many public services of a local nature, including education, to the 
local government at provincial and district level. At that time districts became 
responsible for financing and managing early childhood, primary, junior secondary, 
and senior secondary public schools (Lewis 2014). In 2009, for example, district 
government spending on education accounted for more than half of total spending 
on education by all levels of government, while the proportion of that spending by 
provincial government was just around 5 per cent. In 2016, financial and managerial 
authority for public senior secondary schools was reassigned to the provincial level. 
Islamic schools continue to be administered by the Ministry of Religion.  
In 2003, Education Law 20/2003 was promulgated to specify that 20 per cent 
of national and subnational budgets should be devoted to expenditure on education. 
It effectively mandates all provinces and districts to spend a minimum of 20 per 
cent of their budgets on education (OECD and ADB 2015). The expenditure 
mandate has led to large increases in public education spending and student 
enrolments in junior and senior secondary school have risen significantly as a result 
(Cerdan-Infantes et al. 2013). 
In 1984 the government implemented its National Compulsory Education 
program, requiring all children to complete primary school. The six-year 
compulsory education initiative, along with the school construction program 
implemented during 1970s, played a strong role in increasing enrolments at the 
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primary level and improving educational attainment more generally (Suryadarma 
et al. 2006). By the beginning of 1990s primary education was almost universal 
across the country, and the net enrolment rate at primary education in Indonesia 
reached over 92 per cent in 1994 (BPS 2018). Based in part on this perceived 
success, the government introduced 9 year compulsory schooling in 1994 to 
increase access to junior secondary education. After 20 years of implementing 9 
year basic education, the net enrolment rates at junior secondary level increased by 
almost 30 percentage points, from 50 per cent in 1994 to 77 per cent in 2014. In 
2015, Indonesia extended compulsory schooling to include senior secondary 
school, for which the net enrolment rate was still low, at 59 per cent. 
All the above mentioned efforts made by Indonesian government have 
significantly contributed to the improvement in the education levels of people in 
the country. The share of the population aged 15 and above never attending school 
decreased to 3 per cent in 2017, from 14 per cent in 1994. The percentage of 
population without education qualification reduced by half in the same period, from 
22 to 11 per cent (BPS 2018). There is almost gender equality in the enrolment rate 
in Indonesia, with the gender parity index of female to male students was 0.98 in 
2009/10 (OECD and ADB 2015). 
Despite these achievements, the educational gaps between provinces, rural-
urban areas, and rich and poor families still exist in Indonesia. The gaps are 
especially considerable at junior secondary level and higher. For example, in 2014 
the net enrolment rate at junior secondary school was 95 per cent in Jakarta, 
compared to 32 per cent in Papua (MOEC 2013). Similarly, the difference in the 
rate between urban and rural is more than 10 percentage points (UNICEF cited in 
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OECD and ADB 2015). With regard to economic condition, the dropout rate of 
children from the poorest quintile households is almost 5 times more than that of 
those from the riches households (UNICEF cited in OECD and ADB 2015). 
2.2. Education in Vietnam 
Like Indonesia, the basic education in Vietnam comprises 12 years of schooling: 5 
years of primary level, 4 years of lower secondary and 3 years of upper secondary 
level. In the school year 2014-2015, there were over 861 thousand teachers and 15.3 
million students in the country. The number of students per teacher is 19.6 for 
primary education, 16.3 for lower secondary and 15.9 for upper secondary 
education. The education system consists of nearly 29 thousand schools, including 
over 15 thousand primary, 10 thousand lower secondary, almost 2.5 thousand upper 
secondary, and the remainder comprise schools with combined levels of education 
(GSO 2016). There is at least one primary school located in every commune and 
almost every commune has a lower secondary school. All districts have an upper 
secondary school (MOET 2015). 
In Vietnam, the school year starts on 5th September and lasts until the end of 
May in the following year. In the Education Law, which was first promulgated in 
1998 and then amended in 2005 and 2009, the school starting age for children in 
Vietnam is six year old. In particular, children enter grade 1 in September of the 
calendar year in which they turn six. If students enter school as the regulation age 
and continue their school progress properly without any interruption or grade 
repetition, they will finish grade 12 in the year in which they turn 18. 
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The Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) has overall responsibility 
for managing education in Vietnam. In general, administration of the education 
system is quite centralized  (Jonathan 2011). However, decentralization, which has 
been implemented strongly since 2000s, provides education institutions with 
significant decision-making authority. Decree No. 10/2002/ND-CP and Decree No. 
43/2006/ND-CP are two examples of government’s documents that enhance 
autonomy of public schools and other non-profit service providers. 
Vietnamese government expenditure on education has become among the 
highest in Asia (MOET, GSO, and UIS 2016). Government spending on education 
was just one per cent of GDP in 1990 (Jonathan 2011) but rose to 4.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2008 and 5.7 per cent of GDP in 20131. In 2013, government education 
expenditure accounted for 20 per cent of total spending, increasing from 16 per cent 
in 2009. Expenditure on primary education makes up the largest share of the total 
government and household expenditure on education, around 25 per cent, followed 
by that on secondary and university levels, which individually accounts for roughly 
20 per cent of the total education expenditure (MOET, GSO, and UIS 2016). Like 
other developing countries most public spending on education, about 80 per cent of 
recurrent budgets, is allocated to teacher salaries (Jonathan 2011). 
Vietnam achieved universal primary education in 2000. By 2013, the net 
primary school enrolment rate had risen to 97 per cent (MOET 2015). After 
achieving universal primary education, the government issued degree 88/2001/NĐ-
CP in 2001 to set the target of a universal access to lower secondary education for 
all children aged 11-18 by 2010.  In the school year 2008-2009, however, all 
1 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=VN  
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districts and provinces in the country reported that they had already reached the 
objective (MOET 2015). The net enrolment rates for lower secondary education, 
therefore, have been rapidly increased, from 30 per cent in 1993 to 79 per cent in 
2008 (Jonathan 2011) and 88 per cent in 2013 (MOET 2015). The net enrolment 
rates for upper secondary education surged to 54 per cent in 2008 from 7 per cent 
in 1993 (Jonathan 2011). Some provinces already initiated programs to reach 
universal upper secondary education (MOET 2015). 
Although Vietnam has made remarkable progress in improving average 
access to schooling, there are still considerable inequalities in educational 
attainment, especially between children living in urban and rural areas and between 
those belonging to Kinh and non-Kinh ethnic groups. The net enrolment rates for 
urban and rural areas in 2010, for example, were 86 and 79.7 per cent for lower 
secondary, and 69.6 and 55.4 per cent for upper secondary, respectively (GSO 
2011). Differences in enrolment rates at primary, lower secondary, higher 
secondary schools and university between Kinh and non-Kinh children were 8, 26, 
35 and 18 per cent, respectively (GSO 2010a). Similarly, educational gaps between 
children in low income and high-income family exist across age groups. For 
example, more than a half of children who belong to the 1st income quintiles drop 
out school when they are 15-17 year old, compared to 15.6 per cent of those in the 
5th quintile (Quyen 2011).   
On a more positive note, Vietnam is moving toward gender equality in 
education. The gender gap in favour of boys has been gradually removed, and in 
some education indicators, girls even outperform boys. In particular, the net 
enrolment rate in secondary schools for girls was 5 per cent lower than boys in 
13 
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1990. However, by 2010, enrolment rates for girls exceeded that for boys. For 
instance, the enrolment rates were 82.6 per cent and 80.1 per cent for lower 
secondary education, and 63.1 per cent and 53.7 per cent and for upper secondary 
education in 2010, respectively (Jonathan 2011). 
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3. Effect of parental academic aspirations for a child on 
the child’s time allocation 
3.1. Introduction 
Determinants of children’s education outcomes have been widely studied in both 
educational economics and psychology. Economists acknowledge that a child’s 
time allocation is an important determinant of educational attainment. For example, 
a positive association between study hours and learning outcomes has been 
documented (Hacker et al. 2000; Stanca 2006; Chan, Shum, and Wright 1997), 
although a causal relationship between them remains unclear. The evidence of 
adverse effects that child labour exerts on schooling, in contrast, is uncontroversial 
(Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sánchez 2006; Heady 2003; Lillydahl 1990; 
Psacharopoulos 1997; Ray and Lancaster 2005; Zabaleta 2011). 
In the realm of psychology, parental academic aspirations for a child are 
found to be a robust factor affecting the child’s academic achievement 
(Areepattamannil and Lee 2014; Creed, Conlon, and Zimmer-Gembeck 2007; 
Schoon, Parsons, and Sacker 2004; Strand 2011; Zhang et al. 2011). Psychology 
research has identified the channel of this effect as the association between parental 
aspirations, and emotional and literacy support that parents provide to their child, 
which, in turn, facilitates the child’s educational attainment. For example, Davis-
Kean (2005) constructed a model in which academic expectations of parents for 
their offspring determined their behavior such as reading and playing with their 
child, and thus influenced the child’s cognitive scores. Likewise, Froiland, 
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Peterson, and Davison (2013) highlighted that parental aspirations indirectly 
affected the learning outcomes of a child through influencing the child’s aspirations 
and parents’ supportive behavior, e.g. shared reading with the child. A similar 
conclusion was made by Christofides et al. (2015) and Favara (2017) when they 
both found transmission from parents’ aspirations to their children. 
The indirect impact of parental aspirations and the direct effect of a child’s 
time allocation on the child’s academic achievement found in the existing literature 
together raise a question about whether a child’s time allocation is a missing link in 
the relationship between parental aspirations and the child’s academic achievement. 
Is it possible that parental academic aspirations for a child determine the way that 
parents allocate their child’s time, which, in turn, affects the child’s educational 
attainment? If this is the case, time allocation can be considered as a channel 
through which parental aspirations affect education outcomes of a child. 
Since the impacts of parental aspirations and time allocation on children’s 
education outcomes have received significant attention, they are not the main focus 
of this paper. Instead, this paper investigates the role of parental academic 
aspirations in determining a child’s time allocation. To do this, the traditional model 
of household utility maximization is extended by introducing parental aspirations 
into the child’s human capital function. Next, data from the 2006 and 2014 Vietnam 
Young Lives Survey are employed to test the hypothesis about a positive 
association between parental aspirations and a child’s hours of study, and a negative 
relationship between parental aspirations and a child’s work hours. This paper 
extends the literature by theoretically and empirically investigating how parental 
academic aspirations for a child affect the child’s time allocation.  
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3.2. Determinants of a child’s time allocation in the literature  
In the literature, a child’s time allocation has been examined in the association with 
various socio-economic factors. However, none of the studies up to date have 
looked at the relationship between parental academic aspirations for a child and the 
allocation of a child’s time. 
Poverty is perhaps the most acknowledged determinant of a child’s work and 
study time (Bacolod and Ranjan 2008; Edmonds 2005; Edmonds and Turk 2002; 
Shafiq 2007; Soares, Kruger, and Berthelon 2012; Edmonds 2006a; Malik 2013; 
Ray 2000, 2002). The overall findings demonstrate that poverty increases the 
former and decreases the latter. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this 
general pattern, for instance, independence of school enrollment rate and wealth 
(Hou 2010), and a positive association between child labor and agricultural land 
area (Bhalotra and Heady 2003; Lima, Mesquita, and Wanamaker 2015). 
Apart from the household’s economic condition, both parents’ education and 
a child’s gender are robust predictors of a child’s activities. Specifically, parents’ 
education significantly reduces both school dropouts and child labor (Chevalier et 
al. 2013; Kumar 2015; Fan and Chen 2001; Mukherjee and Das 2008; Shafiq 2007). 
Concerning gender difference, girls have a higher probability of participating in 
domestic work and a lower probability of being involved in paid market work than 
boys (Ilahi 2001; Edmonds 2008); girls are more vulnerable to a household’s 
welfare shocks than boys are (Ilahi 2001); the background of a parent of the same 
gender as the child has stronger effects on the child’s study and work (Emerson and 
Souza 2002).  
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With regards to demographic factors, birth order of a child and number of 
siblings are found to significantly determine how the child spend her or his time 
(Dammert 2010; Dang and Rogers 2013; Edmonds 2006b; Ejrnæs and Pörtner 
2004; Emerson and Souza 2008; Hong 2013; Seid 2013).  While results 
conclusively show that first-born children are more likely to work than later-born 
children, the impacts of birth order on school enrollment are somewhat puzzling. In 
addition, a child’s time allocation is also considered as an outcome of intra-
household bargaining (Kambhampati 2009; Ridao-Cano 2001). However, the 
findings are mixed. Kambhampati (2009) found that a mother’s bargaining power, 
measured by her contribution to household expenditures, appeared to be negatively 
associated with both schooling and child labor. Ridao-Cano (2001) used a mother’s 
education and access to credit to the represent mother’s bargaining power in a 
family. The author concluded that there was a positive association between the 
relative bargaining power of a mother to father and a rise studying time of the child. 
Other determinants that have been examined in the literature include 
remittance and credit (Alcaraz, Chiquiar, and Salcedo 2012; Bouoiyour and Miftah 
2014; Islam and Choe 2013), trade liberalization and globalization (Chaudhuri 
2004; Kis-Katos and Sparrow 2011), geographic differences including regional and 
urban-rural differences (Chamarbagwala 2008; Ersado 2002; Liu 2000), country 
differences (Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sánchez 2006; Maitra and Ray 2002; Ray 
and Lancaster 2005; Rosati and Rossi 2001), and market factors (Chakrabarty, 
Grote, and Lüchters 2011; Du 2013; Ersado 2005; Hong 2013; Kruger 2007; 
Skoufias 1993, 1994). Nonetheless, no research has yet explored the effects of 
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parental academic aspirations for the child on a child’s time allocation. This study, 
to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to do so. 
3.3. Theoretical model  
In economics, the allocation of a child’s time has been considered as the choice of 
parents in the context of maximizing household’s utility (Baland and Robinson 
2000; Basu and Van 1998; Cigno and Rosati 2005; Skoufias 1993). In order to 
examine how parental academic aspirations for a child affect the child’s time 
allocation, this section extends the model of a household’s behaviour by introducing 
parental aspirations into the human capital function of the child.  
Assume that a household consists of a parent and a child, and the child has 1 
unit of time to spend on studying and working. For simplicity, leisure time is 
considered to be constant, and market work and home production are not separated. 
In this household, the parent makes all decisions on allocating the child’s time to 
maximize the household’s utility. The common utility function of the household, as 
shown in equation (3.1), is a function of consumed goods, c, and human capital of 
the child, h. The household’s utility function is twice-differentiable and quasi-
concave in consumption, and a linear function of human capital. The human capital 
that the child obtains, in turn, is a function of study time of the child, st . The human 
capital function has features of a production function, which is twice differentiable 
and quasi-concave in its argument, st . In the human capital function, parental 
academic aspirations for the child, A, help to augment the effectiveness of the 
child’s study time. The unit cost of the child’s study time is s, e.g. school fees, and 
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the wage rate per unit of the child’s work time is w. For the sake of simplicity, the 
parent’s income is assumed to be exogenous in the model and is denoted as y. The 
income of the child and parent together generate the full income of the household, 
which, then, is used to expend on goods, c. The price of consumed commodities is 
normalized to 1.  
The specified model is as follows. 
The household’s utility function:  
maxln ⇒+= hcu  (3.1)  
The utility function u in (3.1), as mentioned above, is twice-differentiable and 
quasi-concave in consumption c, and a linear function of human capital h. Equation 
(3.1) satisfies the conditions: 0)(' >cu , 0)(" <cu , constant)(' =hu and 0)(' >hu . 
The human capital function of the child:  
α)( sAth =  (3.2) 
where, 0>A , 10 <<α . Equation (3.2) satisfies the conditions: 0)(' >sth , 
0)(" <sth .  
The household’s budget constraint2: 
 sw stwtyc −+=  (3.3) 
2. If the hours of housework are taken into account, the budget constraint can be written:  
swph stwtwttyc −+++= )( 0 δ , where y is the non-wage income of the household, th is the 
child’s hours of housework, t0 is the minimum hours that the parent works for wage, wp is the 
unit wage of the parent and 0 < δ < 1. Because the child spends th hours to help the parent with 
housework, the parent can spend more time, δth, on paid work. In this case, it is possible to 
examine the combination of the child’s economic work and housework hours. 
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The child’s time constraint: 
1=+ ws tt  (3.4)  
The non-negativity constraints:  
0≥wt , 0≥st  (3.5) 
Substitution of (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) into (3.1) yields the following model: 
max)()ln( ⇒+−+= αssw AtstwtyU  (3.6)  
Subject to:  
1=+ ws tt , 0≥wt , 0≥st  (3.7) 
To solve the optimization problem shown in equations (3.6) and (3.7), the 
Lagrangian function is formed: 
sswwswssw ttttAtstwtyL µµλ
α ++−−++−+= )1()()ln(  (3.8) 
Differentiating the Lagrangian function with respect to st , wt  , we obtain the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions: 
=
∂
∂
wt
L =+− wwtU µλ)(' 0=+−
−+ wsw stwty
w µλ  (3.9) 
=
∂
∂
st
L =+− sstU µλ)(' 0)( 1 =+−+−+
− − ss
sw
tA
stwty
s µλα αα  (3.10) 
=
∂
∂
λ
L 01 =−− sw tt  (3.11) 
The complementary slackness conditions are: 
0=wwtµ ; 0≥wµ ; 0≥wt  (3.12) 
0=sstµ ; 0≥sµ ; 0≥st  (3.13) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions help to explain why a child specializes in an activity 
and does not take part in another activity.  
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For example, if the child participates in both activities, 0>wt and 0>st  (the 
interior solution), it can be derived from (3.12) and (3.13) that 0== sw µµ . Thus, 
(3.9) and (3.10) can be rewritten as follows.   
)(')(' sw tUtU ==λ  (3.14) 
Equation (3.14) implies that the child is engaged in both activities if the marginal 
return to work equals the marginal return to study.  
Likewise, in the case that the child specializes in study, 0=wt and 0>st , then 
0>wµ and 0=sµ . Thus, )(')(' sww tUtU =+= µλ ; alternatively, this can be 
rewritten as follows.  
)(')(' sw tUtU ≤  (3.15) 
Expression (3.15) shows that the child specializes in study if the marginal return to 
study at least equals the marginal return to work. 
Similarly, an explanation for the case when the child specializes in work can be 
derived. 
Because w, y and A are exogenous variables, solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
provides the solution to the child’s optimal time allocation, which can be written in 
reduced form equations: 
),,( Aywtt ss =  (3.16) 
),,( Aywtt ww =  (3.17) 
To examine the impact of parental academic aspirations for the child on the child’s 
time allocation, let’s consider the inner solution, where 0>wt , 0>st  and 
0== sw µµ . It can be derived from (3.9) and (3.10) that 
[ ] 0)( 1 =−−−+− swstwtytA sws ααα  (3.18) 
22 
 
Chapter 3. Allocation of a child’s time 
  
Substitution of (3.11) into (3.18) results in (3.19)  
( )[ ] 0)( 1 =−−+−+− swswtwytA ss ααα   (3.19) 
The impact of parental academic aspirations can be evaluated without any 
requirement of the explicit solution to work hours and study hours. To do so, the 
next step is to find the total derivative of the equation (3.19). 
( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )[ ]{ } 0)()1()()( 2112 =+−+−++−++−+ −−− ssssss dtswtwytAswtAdAswtwyAt ααααα αααα    
 (3.20)
Transforming equation (3.20) to obtain 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 in one side of the equation as 
follows. 
( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] 0)()1()(
)(
21
12
>
+−+−++−
+−+−
= −−
−
swtwytAswtA
swtwyAt
dA
dt
sss
sss
αααα
α
ααα
α  (3.21) 
In equation (3.21), 0>dAdts  due to ssty > , swtw >1.  and 10 << α   
0)1( <−=−=
dA
dt
dA
td
dA
dt ssw  (3.22) 
Expressions (3.21) and (3.22) show that a rise in parental academic aspirations for 
a child results in an increase in study time and a decrease in work time of the child. 
3.4. Data   
The Vietnam Young Lives Survey (YLS) tracks data on 2000 children who were 
born in 2001/2002 (younger cohort) and 1000 children who were born in 1994/1995 
(older cohort) over a 15-year period. Four rounds of the survey were implemented 
in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2014. The data were collected in 5 provinces representing 
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5 out of 9 economic regions3. The selected provinces were Lao Cai in the North 
East region, Hung Yen in the Red River Delta, Da Nang in the City region, Phu 
Yen in the South Central Coast region and Ben Tre in the Mekong River Delta 
region.  
Although the YLS contains rich information on children’s well-being, the 
question of parental academic aspirations for their child was only asked in round 1 
(2002) and round 2 (2006) for the older cohort, and in round 2, round 3 (2009) and 
round 4 (2014) for the younger cohort. Information on the time that a child spent 
studying, working, and on leisure was only available in round 2 and afterward. Of 
children in the younger cohort, none worked in 2006, when they were 5 years old, 
and just 5 per cent of them worked in 2009, when they were 8 years old. Given the 
unavailability of information relating to parental academic aspirations for their 
children and the lack of variation in hours of work, the empirical analysis in this 
paper includes only children from the old cohort in round 2 and the young cohort 
in round 4. After dropping observations with missing data, the final sample consists 
of 913 children born in 1994-1995, and 1812 children born in 2000-2011. The age 
of children in both cohorts ranges from 11 to 13 year old.  
3. In the Young Lives project, Vietnam is divided into 9 regions: North-West, North-East, Red River 
Delta, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, South-East, Central Highlands, Mekong River 
Delta and City region, which includes the 5 major cities of Vietnam (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, 
Da Nang, Hai Phong, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau)  
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3.5. Empirical strategy 
In the theoretical model, the parent makes a decision on allocating the child’s time 
between studying and working in order to maximize the household’s utility. The 
solution to this problem can be presented by a system of reduced form equations, 
in which study and work time are left-hand side variables, and parental academic 
aspirations for the child appear on the right-hand side of the equations. Empirical 
strategy is, therefore, related to identifying a proper approach to estimate this 
system of reduced form equations. 
3.5.1. Variable selection 
Dependent variables in the equations of time allocation are the number of daily 
hours that a child spends doing economic work and studying. Hours of economic 
work include the time that a child works for pay and works at household business 
without payment. From this definition, the time that a child takes care of younger 
siblings or does chores is not included in hours of economic work. The time that a 
child studies at home and at school together constitutes studying time. Figure 3.1 
and Figure 3.2 respectively present histograms of hours of study and economic 
work by gender and cohort. In general, girls and the younger cohort have more 
hours of study and fewer hours of economic work than their counterpart children. 
Most children spend 6 to 9 hours per day studying, and approximately 3 per cent of 
children do not study at all. The proportion of economically active children is 
around 22 per cent and the working time is usually from 1 to 4 hours.  
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Figure 3.1. Histogram of study hours 
 
Figure 3.2. Histogram of work hours   
The key explanatory variable is parental academic aspirations for a child. In 
the YLS, the question: ‘Ideally what level of formal education would you like 
NAME to complete?’ was answered by the main caregiver. Most of the main 
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caregivers are a biological parent of the child (95 per cent), so their answers are 
used to represent parental academic aspirations. The possible answers for this 
question include none, grades one to 12, post-secondary or vocational training, 
bachelor degree, and master degree. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of parental 
aspirations by gender and cohort. In Figure 3.3, grades one to 12 are converted to 
the levels of education: primary education (grade 6), lower secondary education 
(grade 9), and upper secondary education (grade 12). The data indicate a high level 
of aspiration. Over 70 per cent of parents hope that their child will obtain a 
university degree and above when the child grows up; over 20 per cent of parents 
want their child to complete high school education or vocational training. On 
average, parental aspirations for girls are higher than for boys, and aspirations are 
quite similar for the two cohorts of children. In the econometric analysis, the level 
of education that parents want their child to achieve is converted into years of 
schooling. 
 
Figure 3.3. Histogram of parental academic aspirations for a child 
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Table 3.1.  Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Standard deviation 
Hours of study 7.84 2.12 
Hours of economic work 0.49 1.17 
Hours of housework 1.37 1.24 
Parental aspirations  14.7 2.76 
Younger Cohort 0.66 0.48 
Male 0.51 0.5 
Child's age in month 146.8 3.77 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) -0.85 1.2 
Birth order 1.85 1.06 
Child's highest grade 5.62 0.92 
Adjusted PPVT 0.12 22.72 
Non-Kinh child 0.14 0.34 
Number of children aged 0-5 0.26 0.51 
Education of caregiver 7.15 3.94 
Main caregiver is a parent 0.95 0.21 
Wealth index 0.58 0.15 
North East 0.2 0.4 
Red River Delta 0.2 0.4 
South Central Coast 0.2 0.4 
Mekong River Delta 0.21 0.41 
Ln(average local wage) 9.81 0.45 
Number of children 2749  
Note: (-1) is the value in the previous survey; Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS 
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Other explanatory variables include the child, household and commune 
characteristics. The descriptive statistics of these variables are summarized in Table 
3.1. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) scores are controlled in the 
models because they can represent the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
(WISC) (Anderson and Flax 1968), and the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) (Altepeter 
1989). It is noteworthy that in the analysis of work hours, both household income 
and expenditure are potentially endogenous in the models due to a mutual 
relationship between these economic variables and the child’s work. Using the 
wealth index to represent the economic status of households helps to avoid the 
endogeneity problem to a certain extent. The wealth index is constructed from a 
housing index, an access to service index, and a consumer durable index, which 
economic benefit from the child’s work is generally insufficient to contribute to.4 
3.5.2. Endogeneity and instrumental variables 
Parental academic aspirations for a child are likely to be endogenous in the models 
due to unobservable factors. For example, if a child is the favourite child among his 
or her siblings, parents are more likely to desire a higher level of education for that 
child and less likely to send that child to work. Additionally, parents who worked 
in their childhood tend to require their child to work as well as may have low 
aspirations for their child.  
This study uses the average local wage relative to the education level that 
parents aspire their child to achieve as an instrumental variable for parental 
4 The definitions of variables are summarized in table A1 in Appendix. 
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aspirations5. When parents think about the level of education they desire for their 
child, one of the first things they consider is potential income that the child can 
obtain with that education level. For instance, parents might want their child to 
attain university degree because they observe the wealthy lives of university 
graduate people and hope that their child will be able to have that in the future. 
Alternatively, if parents find that income of high school graduates, on average, is 
good enough, parents might want their child to only finish high school. Specifically, 
the instrumental variable, the average local wage, is calculated for people who (1) 
are the same gender as the child, (2) are 15 to 30 years old, (3) have the highest 
education level that corresponds to the education level that parents aspire for their 
child and (4) live in the same economic region as the child. The age category of 15 
to 30 is selected to construct the instrumental variable because these ages represent 
early career periods. The underlying argument is that parents mostly care about the 
beginning of their child's career. After the age of 30, their child is mature enough 
to be independent. Figure 3.4 shows a positive correlation between parental 
aspirations and the average local wage for both younger and older cohorts. 
 
 
5. Data from the 2006 and 2014 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (2006 and 2014 
VHLSS) are used to extract the instrumental variables. An individual’s wage includes all 
receivables, bonus, and allowance in cash or in-kind converted to the monetary unit that he or 
she receives from all of the jobs. For more details of the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS, see Vietnam 
General Statistics Office (2008, 2016). 
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Figure 3.4. Parental aspirations by the average local wage and cohort  
3.5.3. Model specification 
Hours of an activity are positive if the child participates in the specified activity and 
0 if the child is not involved in the activity. In this case, hours of the activity 
constitute a censored variable. However, the histograms show that only the child’s 
economic work hours are censored and pile up at 0 (Figure 3.2).  The hours of study 
appear to be normally distributed (Figure 3.1). For this reason, the Tobit model 
seems to be an appropriate specification for economic work hours and OLS still 
provides efficient estimators of study hours. Because a child’s time is jointly 
allocated in a single decision-making process, hours of economic work and study 
should be simultaneously estimated in a single system of equations. Given the 
potential endogeneity of parental aspirations, an additional reduced form equation, 
apart from equations for study and work hours, is included in the system to estimate 
aspirations on instrumental and exogenous variables.  
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In summary, in the context of a child’s time allocation and the potential 
endogeneity of parental aspirations, the empirical model simultaneously estimates 
a system of 2 linear equations for hours of study and parental aspirations, and 1 
Tobit model for hours of work. This system is called a mixed process model 
(Roodman 2011). The specific model can be written as follows.  
13111 uYXY ++= φβ     (3.23) 
),0max( 23222 uYXY ++= φβ  (3.24) 
 vZXY ++= λα3  (3.25) 
where 1Y  and 2Y  are observable hours of study and economic work, respectively; X 
are explanatory variables including the child, household and commune 
characteristics; 3Y  denotes parental academic aspirations for the child; Z represents 
the instrumental variables, i.e. the average local wage. 
The error terms 1u , 2u  and v are assumed to follow a multivariate normal 
distribution. In particular,   
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where 21δ , 
2
2δ  and 
2
vδ  are variances of 1u , 2u  and v, respectively; ρ  is the 
correlation coefficients between 1u  and 2u ; iγ  is the correlation coefficient between 
iu and v.  
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3.6. Estimation results 
3.6.1. Impacts of parental academic aspirations on a child’s hours of 
economic work and study 
This section discusses the estimation results for the system of equations (3.23) – 
(3.25), as shown in Table 3.2. The discussion is first about the equations of the main 
interest, hours of work and study, followed by the equation of parental academic 
aspirations. 
The estimation results are in line with those derived from the theoretical 
model: children of parents with higher academic aspirations spend more time 
studying and less time working than their counterparts. As expected, parental 
academic aspirations have a larger impact on study than on work due to the direct 
link between the aspirations and the child’s study. The point instrumented estimates 
show that a 1 year increase in parental aspirations for the child’s schooling, on 
average, leads to a rise of 0.2 hours in study time and a decrease of 0.12 hours in 
work time. The effects are statistically significant at 1 per cent level in both 
equations. 
Impacts of other explanatory variables on work hours are quite different, even 
opposite, to those on study hours, due to the trade-off between the two activities. 
Some notable results are follows. Children in the younger cohort study more and 
work less than their counterparts in the older cohort. While there is no difference in 
work hours between boys and girls, girls significantly spend more time studying 
than boys do. Minority children on average have to work 1 hour more than their 
majority counterparts. This also reflects the fact that minority children suffer from 
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more disadvantages than the Kinh ethnic children.  Number of children aged 0-5 
living in the family significantly reduces total hours of economic work for a child. 
One possible reason is that the 11-13 year old children might spend time taking care 
of their younger siblings instead of doing economic work. 
Other variables, such as BMI-for-age z-score, birth order, PPVT and wealth 
index do not significantly affect the child’s time allocation. Related to geographic 
factor, children in the city region, which is the base region in the models, work least 
and study more than children in most of the other region, except for those in Red 
River Delta.  
Table 3.2. Mixed process models: hours of study, economic work and 
parental aspirations 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic work 
Parental 
aspirations 
Parental aspirations 0.199*** -0.119***  
 (0.021) (0.046)  
Younger Cohort 0.831*** -0.511*** -2.548*** 
 (0.079) (0.183) (0.082) 
Male -0.232*** 0.164 -1.212*** 
 (0.066) (0.156) (0.066) 
Child's age in month -0.054*** 0.025 -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) 0.001 -0.040 0.094*** 
 (0.029) (0.074) (0.028) 
Birth order -0.032 0.161** -0.019 
 (0.033) (0.072) (0.031) 
Child's highest grade 0.537*** -0.168* 0.417*** 
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 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic work 
Parental 
aspirations 
 (0.047) (0.098) (0.042) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.001 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Non-Kinh child -0.091 0.958*** 0.166 
 (0.139) (0.289) (0.132) 
Number of children aged 
0-5 -0.074 -0.443*** -0.091 
 (0.066) (0.157) (0.063) 
Education of caregiver 0.032*** -0.051* 0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.011) 
Main caregiver is a 
parent 0.151 0.842** 0.155 
 (0.156) (0.426) (0.148) 
Wealth index 0.548* -0.614 2.961*** 
 (0.317) (0.751) (0.292) 
North East -0.705*** 2.963*** 3.451*** 
 (0.136) (0.349) (0.141) 
Red River Delta 0.361*** 1.567*** 3.624*** 
 (0.109) (0.312) (0.128) 
South Central Coast -0.597*** 1.822*** 3.040*** 
 (0.117) (0.317) (0.124) 
Mekong River Delta -0.583*** 0.969*** 4.471*** 
 (0.119) (0.336) (0.140) 
Ln(average local wage)   5.792*** 
   (0.117) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significant level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
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Estimation results for parental aspirations, equation (3.25), are presented in 
Table 3.2, Column 3. The coefficient of the instrumental variable, the average local 
wage, is significant and has an expected sign. In particular, a 1 per cent rise in the 
average local wage is associated with a 0.06 year increase in parental aspirations. 
In addition, parental aspirations are higher for girls and children in the older cohort 
than for boys and those in the younger cohort, respectively. Education of parents 
and economic condition are positively associated with parental aspirations for the 
child.  
3.6.2. Impact of parental academic aspirations on a child’s hours of 
housework 
In this section, apart from the 2 main activities of interest in the literature: economic 
work and study, housework is considered as another activity of children, and thus 
examined under the impact of parental aspirations. Hours of housework consist of 
the time that a child does chores and takes care of younger children. Around 75 per 
cent of children are involved in housework; about 15 per cent of them devoted 3 
hours or more per day to such activity (Figure 3.5). Hours of housework appear to 
be normally distributed, so they can be estimated as a linear function of explanatory 
variables.  In terms of modelling, hours of housework can be represented by 
equation (3.26). 
43444 uYXY ++= φβ     (3.26) 
where 4Y  is the time that a child does housework; the error terms 4u  are assumed to 
follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
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Figure 3.5. Histogram of housework hours 
Table 3.3. Mixed process models: hours of study, economic work and 
housework, and parental aspirations 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic 
work 
Hours of 
housework 
Parental 
aspirations 
Parental aspirations 0.199*** -0.117** -0.023  
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.018)  
Ln(average local 
wage) 
   5.792*** 
   (0.117) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses; Control variables: Child characteristics (gender, age, BMI score, birth order, 
highest grade, PPVT, ethnicity), household characteristics (number of 0-5 year old children, 
caregiver’s education, caregiver is parent, wealth index), and regional dummy variables; The full 
estimation results are presented in Appendix, Table A2. 
The empirical model is, now, extended to include equations (3.23) – (3.26). 
A summary of estimation results is provided in Table 3.3. The results suggest that 
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
0 2 4 6 8
Hours
Boys (mean = 1.16)
Girls (mean = 1.57)
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
0 2 4 6 8
Hours
Youngers (mean = 1.35)
Olders (mean = 1.38)
Source: 2006, 2014 Young Lives
37 
 
Chapter 3. Allocation of a child’s time 
  
parental academic aspirations for a child insignificantly affect the time allocated to 
housework. Estimation results for study, work and parental aspirations are almost 
unchanged compared to those in Table 3.2. 
3.6.3. Gender difference in the impact of parental academic aspirations 
Table 3.4. Mixed process models: hours of study, economic work and 
housework, and parental aspirations, by gender 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic 
work 
Hours of 
housework 
Parental 
aspirations 
 
Boys 
Parental aspirations 0.172*** -0.157** -0.003  
 (0.032) (0.070) (0.029)  
Ln(average local 
wage)    5.731*** 
    (0.181) 
 
Girls 
Parental aspirations 0.241*** -0.142*** -0.043**  
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.021)  
Ln(average local 
wage) 
   7.031*** 
    (0.150) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses; Control variables: Child characteristics (age, BMI score, birth order, highest 
grade, PPVT, ethnicity), household characteristics (number of 0-5 year old children, caregiver’s 
education, caregiver is parent, wealth index), and regional dummy variables; The full estimation 
results are presented in Appendix, Table A3 and Table A4. 
This section estimates the models of a child’s time allocation for boys and girls 
separately to explore the gender perspective in the impacts of parental aspirations.  
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The estimation results are presented in Table 3.4. As shown in the estimation for 
boys (Panel A), aspirations of parents still exert an increasing impact on the time 
that a child spends studying, and a reducing effect on hours of work, the effect is, 
however, more pronounced for studying hours spent by girls and working hours 
committed by boys. Interestingly, parental aspirations now impose a five per cent 
level significant impact on hours of housework for girls (even still insignificant for 
boys). Specifically, a one-year increase in parental academic aspirations leads to a 
decrease of 0.04 hours that girls do housework every day.  
3.6.4. Robustness of the estimated impacts 
Although an advantage of the mixed process model (3.23) – (3.26) is to estimate 
coefficients based on the accurate distribution the of the dependent variable in each 
equation, it might be criticized for providing inefficient and even inconsistent 
estimators in the case of heteroscedasticity (Roodman 2011). Therefore, in this 
section, the generalized method of moments (GMM) is applied to estimate the 
system of equations describing the child’s time allocation. By calculating the 
optimal weighting matrix, GMM provides consistent and efficient estimators in the 
appearance of endogeneity and heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge 2010). It is 
noteworthy that GMM is, however, applicable only for general linear models. As a 
result, hours of activities carried out by the child and parental aspirations are 
assumed to be linear functions of control variables and instrumental variables in the 
GMM estimation. 
The main results of the GMM estimation are presented in Table 3.5. It can be 
seen that the effects of parental aspirations derived from GMM estimation are 
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consistent with those from the mixed process model. Specifically, parental 
aspirations increase studying time and decrease work hours. Although parental 
aspirations have no effect on hours of housework for boys, they significantly reduce 
the time that girls do chores and take care of younger siblings. The magnitude of 
effects is almost unchanged for hours of study and housework, but under the 
assumption that hours of economic work are normally distributed, the impact of 
parental aspirations on this activity is underestimated.  
Table 3.5. GMM estimation: Effects of parental aspirations on hours of 
study, economic work and housework 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic 
work 
Hours of 
housework 
 
All children 
Model for all children 0.199*** -0.080*** -0.030* 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.016) 
 
Boys 
Model for boys 0.172*** -0.105*** -0.014 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.022) 
 
Girls 
Model for girls 0.241*** -0.074*** -0.050** 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.021) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses; Control variables: Child characteristics (gender, age, BMI score, birth order, 
highest grade, PPVT, ethnicity), household characteristics (number of 0-5 year old children, 
caregiver’s education, caregiver is parent, wealth index), and regional dummy variables. 
Instrumental variables: logarithm of the average local wage; The full estimation results are 
presented in Appendix, Table A5, Table A6 and Table A7. 
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3.6.5. Impacts of hours of study and work on education outcomes 
Although the impacts of a child’s time allocation on education outcomes are not the 
focus of this paper, as mentioned above, it is interesting to look at the completed 
picture of the relationship between parental academic aspirations, child’s time 
allocation and academic achievement. Hence, this section establishes a completed 
model, in which parental academic aspirations influence the allocation of a child’s 
time, which, in turn, affects the child’s academic performance. Academic 
performance is represented by maths test scores, which is scaled from 0 to 10. The 
distribution of maths test scores is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6. Histogram of Maths test scores 
Since the test scores are relatively normally distributed, they can be estimated 
with a linear function, as shown equation (3.27). 
𝑌𝑌5 = 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽5 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑌𝑌1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑌𝑌2 + 𝑢𝑢5 (3.27) 
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Where, 5Y  is maths test scores; the error terms 5u  are assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution.  
Table 3.6. Mixed process models: Maths scores, hours of study, economic 
work, and parental aspirations 
 Maths   
score 
Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic 
work 
Parental 
aspirations 
Hours of study 0.842***    
 (0.116)    
Hours of economic 
work -0.118**    
 (0.057)    
Parental aspirations  0.209*** -0.120***  
  (0.021) (0.045)  
Ln(average local 
wage)    5.816*** 
    (0.114) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses; Control variables: Child characteristics (gender, age, BMI score, birth order, 
highest grade, ethnicity), household characteristics (number of 0-5 year old children, caregiver’s 
education, caregiver is parent, wealth index), and regional dummy variables. Instrumental 
variables: logarithm of the average local wage; The full estimation results are presented in 
Appendix, Table A8. 
The empirical model is, now, extended to include equations (3.23), (3.24), 
(3.25) and (3.27). As indicated in Table 3.6, column 1, both hours of study and 
hours of work significantly affect the maths test scores and study time creates a 
larger impact in terms of absolute value. On average, one additional hour of study 
leads to a 0.8 point increase in the test scores, while working one more hour reduces 
the test scores by 0.1 point. The impacts of parental academic aspirations on the 
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time that a child spends studying and working are still similar to those found in 
section 3.6.1.    
3.7. Summary of main findings and direction for future studies  
This paper has investigated the impact of parental academic aspirations for a child 
on the child’s time allocation. First, a theoretical model was outlined by extending 
the household utility maximization problem. In the model, parental aspirations are 
an augmenting factor that helps to increase the productivity of the child’s study 
time. A statistical analysis of optimal time allocation shows that parental aspirations 
are positively associated with studying time and negatively associated with the 
working time of the child. 
Then, the impact of parental aspirations was tested by econometric methods. 
Taking into account potential endogeneity, parental aspirations were instrumented 
by the average local wage of people having the same education level to that parents 
want their child to achieve. The empirical findings support the theoretical analysis. 
In particular, an increase in parental academic aspirations of 1 year, on average, 
leads to a decrease of 0.2 hours in working time committed by the child and a rise 
in study time of over 0.1 hours. Parental aspirations, despite being insignificant in 
the equation of housework for boys, still help to reduce hours that girls do 
housework. A further analysis shows that academic performance of a child is 
negatively associated with number hours of work, and positively associated with 
the time he or she spends studying. 
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The consistent findings relating to the role of parental aspirations in 
determining a child’s studying and working time from both theoretical and 
empirical analyses suggest that in a fight again child labour and an attempt to 
increase educational attainment of the young generations, interventions or policies 
that raise parents’ academic expectations and aspirations for a child can positively 
affect the child outcomes.  The interventions can be those concerning to economic 
benefits of education, social returns to education, and changes in the evaluation of 
education. These findings are particularly important for a developing country like 
Vietnam, where child labour and dropouts are still common.  
In regard to research related to this topic, the findings also show that the 
allocation of the child’s time is a missing link in the relationship between parental 
aspirations and the child’s academic achievements. Thus, future studies might 
consider the allocation of a child’s time as a channel through which parental 
aspirations affect a child’s educational attainment.  
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4. Ethnic gaps in child education outcomes in Vietnam 
4.1. Introduction 
Like poverty, inequality is multi-dimensional. In countries with multiple ethnic 
groups, understanding inequality across groups becomes crucial from an analytical 
as well as a policy perspective. In Vietnam, there are 54 different ethnic groups, of 
which the Kinh majority accounts for 86 per cent of the population; the share of all 
other ethnic groups is 14 per cent. The largest minority ethnic groups, such as Tay, 
Thai, Muong and Khmer, account for less than 2 per cent. The living standards of 
minority groups are much lower than those of the Kinh. For example, the poverty 
rate in 2010 was 12.9 per cent for the Kinh while more than 66 per cent of the 
minority population was poor (Badiani et al. 2013). In 2012, the per capita income 
of Kinh households was VND 23 million, which was more than double that of non-
Kinh households (McCaig, Benjamin, and Brandt 2015). The share of households 
among the Kinh having permanent houses, safe water or hygienic toilet facilities is 
double that of the non-Kinh (GSO 2010b).  
Ethnic inequality in education is also considerable. The results of the 2009 
Vietnam population and housing census (GSO 2010b) show that the literacy rate of 
the population aged 10 and over is 96 per cent for Kinh compared to 78 per cent for 
minority groups. Differences in enrolment rates at primary, lower secondary, higher 
secondary schools and university between Kinh and non-Kinh children were 8 per 
cent, 26 per cent, 35 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively. The ethnic gap in 
education attainment is also noteworthy. The proportion of non-Kinh population 
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aged 15 and over with no schooling is 23 per cent compared to 3 per cent for the 
Kinh. The dropout rate for the non-Kinh is double that for the Kinh and the late 
enrolment rate is 5-times greater (WB 2009). The ethnic gaps in reading and maths 
test scores were found for all students aged 9 to 20 (Dang 2012). Years of schooling 
for minority ethnic people aged 15-25 were persistently lower than those for the 
majority counterparts during the period 1992-2014 (Dang and Glewwe 2017). In 
addition, educational inequality within a non-Kinh ethnic group is also high. The 
education Gini index for the Kinh population is 0.25 while for most other ethnicities 
the index ranges from 0.28 to 0.7 (Rew 2008).  
Glewwe, Chen, and Katare (2015) and Arouri, Ben, and Nguyen (2016) are 
among the few to investigate the ethnic gap in education in Vietnam. Using the 
2006 Young Lives survey (YLS) data, Glewwe, Chen, and Katare (2015) concluded 
that Kinh children had better reading and maths skills than non-Kinh children. 
Language barriers were an obstacle to minority children catching up with their 
majority peers. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results revealed that household 
expenditure and parents’ education were the main contributors to the ethnic gaps in 
test scores. Applying the same methodology on pooled data from the 2006 YLS and 
2009 YLS, Arouri, Ben, and Nguyen (2016) pointed out that child health, mother’s 
education and household demographic factors were mainly responsible for the 
difference in education outcomes between Kinh and non-Kinh children. In research 
on ethnic earnings inequality in Vietnam (Baulch et al. 2010; Doan 2011; Imai, 
Gaiha, and Kang 2011; Pham and Reilly 2009; Van de Walle and Gunewardena 
2001), low returns to education in non-Kinh groups compared to the Kinh group 
were also documented. Low returns to education might perpetuate the ethnic gap in 
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education because such returns discourage investment in education among minority 
populations. Other possible causes for the non-Kinh’s lagging performance in 
education are difficulties in physical access to school and the quality of schools in 
minority areas (WB 2009). Most minority ethnic groups are located in remote and 
mountainous areas, where infrastructure is still limited.  
Ethnic and racial disparities in education have been found in both developed 
and developing countries. Cook and Evans (2000) focused attention on the 
convergence of reading and maths test scores between 13-year-old black and white 
students in the United States during the period 1970-1988. They decomposed the 
differences in test scores into variation in school and family characteristics and 
within-school changes. Their findings indicated that three quarters of the 
convergence was attributable to within-school changes while the variation in family 
backgrounds and school characteristics accounted for the rest. The changes in the 
quality of schools negligibly influenced differences in maths test scores while they 
considerably reduced the divergence in reading test scores during the period. In 
spite of this convergence, persistent gaps in education attainment and the dropout 
rates between young black and white Americans still exit and the gaps are even 
wider if the prison population is counted (Ewert, Sykes, and Pettit 2014). In 
Australia, indigenous/non-indigenous gaps in reading, writing and numeracy test 
scores were found in all states for all grade 3, grade 5 and grade 9 students (Ford 
2013). The gaps even occurred before children went to school, as found by Leigh 
and Gong (2009) who examined the cognitive test scores for 4 and 5-year-old 
children. Socioeconomic differences between indigenous and non-indigenous 
populations mostly explained the gaps. However, Baert and Cockx (2013) 
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discovered that the unexplained part became considerable if schooling delays were 
taken into account. Moreover, the authors pointed out that the education attainment 
gap between the third generation non-Western populations in Belgium and native 
Belgians started to rise in year 4 of secondary school. Sakellariou (2008) sought an 
explanation for the test score gap between indigenous and non-indigenous students 
in Peru in 1997. The results implied that the peer effect, measured by the share of 
non-indigenous students and the average parents’ education of students in the class, 
explained between one half to two thirds of the gaps. School quality was found to 
be unimportant for the test score gaps.  
This paper aims to discover the key contributors to the education gap between 
Kinh and non-Kinh children in Vietnam. The paper contributes to the literature by 
investigating the ethnic gap across different education outcomes. It is hypothesised 
that determinants vary in enrolment, schooling progress and performance, and in 
different ethnic groups, thus leading to variation in their contribution to the ethnic 
gaps in the three education outcomes, which has not been explicitly specified in the 
aforementioned studies in education in Vietnam. In addition, the current study, 
unlike previous empirical studies which used household data to estimate test scores, 
employs school data to capture peer, class and school characteristics in models of 
test scores. Finally, various econometric techniques including decomposition for a 
multilevel model are used to deal with different measurements of education 
outcomes. Although multilevel models have been widely applied to analyse school 
survey data, to the best of my knowledge multilevel model decomposition 
techniques have not yet been used in the literature to examine education outcomes. 
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4.2. Data  
This paper employs data from two different surveys, the 2009 Young Lives Survey 
(YLS) and the 2011-2012 Young Lives School Survey (YLSS). The former 
provides information related to enrolment and schooling progress and the latter 
supplies data on performance at school in Vietnam. 
The YLS tracks data on two groups of children who were born in 2001-2002 
(the younger cohort) and in 1994-1995 (the older cohort) over a 15-year period. In 
Vietnam 2000 children in the younger cohort and 1000 children in the older cohort 
were selected in the sample. The sampling procedures were designed to ensure that 
the sample proportionally covered urban, rural and mountainous areas, in the 
northern, central and southern regions in Vietnam.  
According to Nguyen (2008), the YLS, however, lacks representativeness 
because the survey was designed to focus on poor children and was based on non-
random sampling. The poverty indexes and access to basic services in the YLS  are 
lower than those in national representative surveys (Nguyen 2008). Table 4.1 
displays summary statistics concerning education and ethnicity calculated from 
YLS and two other nationally representative samples, the 15 per cent sample of 
2009 Vietnam Population and Housing Census (MPC 2017), and 2010 Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Survey. It can be seen that the YLS produces relatively 
similar enrolment rates to the survey conducted in the same year, the 2009 Census, 
except for the enrolment rate of non-Kinh children in the older cohort, which is 12 
per cent lower.  
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Table 4.1. The share of ethnic minorities in population and the gross 
enrolment rates 
 2009 
Young Lives 
2009 
Census 
2010 
VHLSS 
Non-Kinh population (%) 13.8 14.3 15.7 
Enrolment rate (%)    
Younger cohort (7-8) 98.5 96.4 99.5 
Kinh 99.7 98.4 99.7 
Non-Kinh 91.4 91.1 98.5 
Older cohort (14-15) 76.2 76.7 80.1 
Kinh 80.0 81.7 83.6 
Non-Kinh 50.6 62.9 69.2 
Data source: 2009 YLS, 15 per cent sample of Vietnam Population and Housing Census, 2010 
VHLSS 
The difference in the enrolment rates of the older cohort between the surveys 
can be partly explained by the difference in the time that the surveys were 
conducted. In particular, the census date was 1st April 2009, which fell in the second 
semester of the 2008-09 school year, when most 15-year-old children in Vietnam 
were in the last year of lower secondary school. The 2009 YLS data were collected 
from September to December, 2009, the first semester of the 2009-10 school year, 
when most 15-year-old children were in the first year of upper secondary school if 
they were enrolled in school. Hence, in between the two surveys there was a 
transition from lower secondary school to upper secondary school, in which a 
number of students, especially disadvantaged students, might drop out of school. 
To take this transition into account in the sample of the 2009 census, it would be 
more precise to look at children aged 15-16, rather than those aged 14-15. The 
enrolment rate of non-Kinh children aged 15-16 in the sample of 2009 census is 51 
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per cent, almost the same as that of the older cohort in the 2009 YLS (see Table 
4.1). 
Therefore, data from the YLS still seem to be valid for examining the ethnic 
gap in education. Moreover, according to Nguyen (2008), YLS data, despite not 
being suitable for constructing indicators related to children’s welfare, are useful 
for modelling and analysing causal relations.  After dropping observations with 
missing information, the final sample includes 2912 children. Of the total sample, 
971 children belong to the older cohort, who were 14 or 15 years old at the time of 
the survey, and 1950 children are from the younger cohort, 7 or 8-year-old children 
(see Table 4.2). The share of minority ethnic children is 13.8 per cent in the YLS. 
Table 4.2. Sampling of 2009YLS and 2011-2012YLSS 
 Ethnicity Gender Total 
 Kinh Non-
Kinh 
Boys Girls  
2009 YLS 2516 405 1483 1438 2921 
Younger cohort (7-8)  1,671 279 1,004 946 1950 
Older cohort (14-15) 845 126 481 490 971 
      
2011-2012 YLSS 2,879 399 1,734 1,550 3,284 
Data source: 2009 YLS and 2011-2012 YLSS  
The YLSS was conducted by the Young Lives project in Vietnam in 2011-
2012. The aim of the survey is to collect information about students’ backgrounds 
and their learning outcomes. The sample contains the Young Lives children, who 
were in the younger cohort and enrolled in grade 5 in the school year 2011-2012, 
and their peers. In the class in which the Young Lives children were enrolled, their 
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peers were randomly selected so that the maximum number of students selected in 
each class was 20. The sample contains 3284 grade 5 students, of which 1138 are 
Young Lives children from 176 classes and 92 school sites. Data collection was 
implemented at child, teacher and principal levels. The share of non-Kinh children 
in the YLSS is 12.2 per cent, lower than that in the YLS, which speaks to the lower 
enrolment rates of ethnic minority groups. After dropping observations with 
missing information, the sample of the YLSS used in analysis includes 3218 
children (see Table 4.2). 
4.3. Methodology  
4.3.1. Multi-level model: estimation and decomposition 
School survey data on students’ performance can generate three levels of data: 
individual, class and school. The multilevel structure of the data creates 
dependencies among the levels. For example, students studying in one class share 
the same class, teacher and peer characteristics. Therefore, the performance of one 
student in the class is not independent from that of other students. The consequence 
of ignoring the dependencies is to underestimate standard errors, which leads to 
finding significant impacts when they do not exist (Rasbash 2008).  
A multilevel model of students’ performance follows. 
 ijkjkkkjkijkijkijk uvXXXES εβββγα +++++++= 332211  (4.1) 
where S is scores and 1X , 2X , 3X comprise explanatory variables. For the sake of 
decomposing the ethnic differences in education performance, a dummy variable, 
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E, defining minor ethnicity is included in the model. Subscripts i, j, k indicate data 
at individual, class and school levels, so 1X , 2X , 3X are vectors of explanatory 
variables at individual, class and school levels, respectively. Similarly, the error 
terms in the multi-level model are split into three components: kv are school level 
error terms, representing school random effects; jkv  are class level error terms, 
representing class random effects; and ijkε  are individual level error terms.  
The estimated equation (1) is 
 ijkjkkkjkijkijkijk uvXXXES εβββγα ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ 332211 +++++++=     (4.2) 
The difference in the means of the test scores between the minority ethnic 
group, m, and the majority ethnic group, M, can be decomposed by using the method 
proposed by Jacobson, Robinson, and Bluthenthal (2007), as follows. 
 mMmultilevel SS −=∆  (4.3) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) γβ ˆˆˆˆˆˆ
3
1
−−+−+−=∆ ∑
=
mMmM
i
m
i
M
ii
multilevel uuvvXX   (4.4) 
In equation (4.4), ( )∑
=
−
3
1
ˆ
i
m
i
M
ii XXβ  is the explained part, providing the contribution 
of explanatory variables to the ethnic gap in the test scores and  
( ) ( )mMmM uuvv ˆˆˆˆ −+−  is the random part generated by school and class level errors; 
γˆ  is the unexplained component created by unobservable factors. 
53 
 
Chapter 4. Ethnic gaps in education outcomes 
  
4.3.2. Probit model: estimation and decomposition 
Consider a Probit model of an education outcome measured by a binomial variable, 
Y, e.g. school enrolment: 
 ( ) ( )βXFXYP == |1  (4.5) 
where Y = 1 if the child enrols in school, and Y = 0 otherwise. The right-hand side 
of equation (4.5) is the conditional probability that Y = 1. F is a cumulative normal 
distribution function. Equation (4.5) can be estimated by maximum likelihood 
methods. 
The decomposition of the Probit model was developed by Powers, Yoshioka, and 
Yun (2011) as follows. 
 )()(Pr mmMM
mMobit XFXFPP ββ −=−=∆  (4.6) 
 { } { })()()()(Pr mmMmMmMMobit XFXFXFXF ββββ −+−=∆  (4.7) 
The first component in the right-hand side of equation (4.7) is the explained part 
representing the difference in education outcomes attributable to differences in 
covariates, and the second component is the unexplained part caused by differences 
in estimated coefficients. 
4.3.3. Variable selection 
The descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in 
Table 4.3.  
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Education outcomes are measured by enrolment, schooling for age and test 
scores. The enrolment rate and the schooling for age index are calculated from the 
YLS while test scores are derived from the YLSS. 
Table 4.3. Mean of variables in the models by ethnic groups and T_test of 
equal means 
Variables  Kinh Non-Kinh Difference 
From the YLS    
School enrolment 0.932 0.788 0.144*** 
Schooling for age index 0.959 0.766 0.193*** 
Schooling for age index = 1 0.881 0.59 0.291*** 
Age in month 125.449 122.252 3.197 
Younger cohort 0.664 0.689 -0.025 
Boy 0.505 0.523 -0.018 
Height-for-age z score -1.072 -2.079 1.007*** 
Health problems 0.072 0.104 -0.032** 
Mother's year of schooling 6.528 1.272 5.257*** 
Father's years of schooling 6.845 2.101 4.744*** 
Number of siblings 0.829 1.432 -0.603*** 
Male head 0.866 0.936 -0.07*** 
Asset index 0.571 0.329 0.242*** 
Health shock 0.242 0.237 0.005 
Newborn baby shock 0.054 0.109 -0.055*** 
School travel time 16.026 24.048 -8.022*** 
Paved road in commune 0.935 0.696 0.239*** 
Factory in commune 0.61 0.328 0.281*** 
Ln(population in commune) 9.175 8.412 0.763*** 
From the YLSS    
IRT-adjusted maths scores 18.861 14.398 4.463*** 
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Variables  Kinh Non-Kinh Difference 
IRT-adjusted Vietnamese scores 20.821 16.15 4.671*** 
Age in month 124.933 126.659 -1.725*** 
Boy 0.523 0.537 -0.015 
Health problem 0.224 0.212 0.012 
Speaking Vietnamese at home 0.985 0.38 0.605*** 
Mother's years of schooling 7.494 2.886 4.608*** 
Unknown mother's education 0.196 0.124 0.072*** 
Father's years of schooling 7.49 4.439 3.051*** 
Unknown father's education 0.239 0.15 0.089*** 
Older siblings 0.897 1.367 -0.47*** 
School travel time 11.496 16.525 -5.029*** 
Asset index 0.722 0.661 0.061*** 
Days absent from school of 
classmates 0.253 0.432 -0.18*** 
Grade repetition of classmates 0.039 0.07 -0.031*** 
Class size 30.566 18.698 11.868*** 
Television in classroom 0.098 0.003 0.096*** 
Dropout at school 0.043 0.204 -0.161*** 
School accesses to internet 0.428 0.148 0.280*** 
Newly established school 0.021 0.083 -0.062*** 
   Notes: Data source: 2009 YLS and 2011-2012 YLSS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1% 
The enrolment rate of the younger cohort in the YLS is 98.5 per cent and that 
of the older cohort is 76.2 per cent. The ethnic gap in the enrolment rate for the 
former group of children is more than 8 per cent and that for the latter is almost 30 
per cent. For all Young Lives children, the ethnic gap in the enrolment rate is 14.4 
per cent (see Table 4.3). 
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The schooling for age index, denoted as SAGE (Ray and Lancaster 2005), is 
calculated by the formula 
 6-age schild' the
child by the attainted gradehighest  theSAGE =  (4.8) 
where 6 is the age that children in Vietnam start school. For 6-year-old children, 
who are currently studying grade 1, the index is replaced by 1. Hence, the values of 
SAGE range from 0 to 1 (see Figure 4.1). If a child starts school at age 6, does not 
repeat any grade and continues to enrol in school, her or his SAGE index is 1. 
Unlike enrolment, which describes the present status of schooling, SAGE takes into 
account late starts and grade repetition. Therefore, the SAGE index reflects any 
distortions in schooling progress (Dorman 2008). Although the age that children 
start primary school, as regulated by law, is 6, in some special cases children are 
allowed to start school later than the regulated age. This applies to children in 
remote areas, minority ethnic children, children migrating from abroad to Vietnam 
and children with disabilities. Among 2921 Young Lives children, 95 per cent of 
Kinh children started school at 6 or earlier compared to 75 per cent of non-Kinh 
children. The schooling for age index is also quite different for Kinh and non-Kinh 
children. The proportion of Kinh children with a SAGE index equal to 1 is 88 per 
cent and that of non-Kinh children is 59 per cent (see Table 4.4). 
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Figure 4.1. Histogram of Schooling for age index 
In the YLSS, grade 5 pupils were requested to do tests in maths and 
Vietnamese. Each test contains 30 multiple choice questions with four options. A 
correct answer adds one mark to the raw test score. Because the tests were designed 
to assess students’ understanding of the grade 5 curriculum, they did not include 
advanced questions, at which good students might be skilled (Rolleston et al. 2013). 
Moreover, the multiple choice format of the tests might lead to inflated test scores 
as a result of lucky guesses. Thus, Item Response Theory (IRT) (see (Baker 2001; 
Van Der Linden and Hambleton 1997) is used to adjust the test scores. For the sake 
of comparison, the IRT-adjusted test scores are normalised with the same means 
and variances to the raw scores. The IRT-adjusted test scores are highly correlated 
with the raw test scores, i.e. 0.989 for maths and 0.971 for Vietnamese. The 
distributions of raw and IRT-adjusted test scores for Kinh and non-Kinh pupils are 
shown in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. The gaps exist in both maths and Vietnamese 
test scores and range from 4.4 points to 4.6 points (see Table 4.4). 
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Pe
rc
en
t
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Schooling for age index
Non-Kinh Kinh
 
58 
 
Chapter 4. Ethnic gaps in education outcomes 
  
 
Figure 4.2. Distributions of raw and IRT-adjusted Maths test scores by ethnicity 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Distributions of raw and IRT-adjusted Vietnamese test scores 
by ethnicity 
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To make the estimation results comparable between the models of different 
education outcomes, explanatory variables in each model are constructed using the 
same method, where possible. In the estimations of enrolment and SAGE, 
explanatory variables consist of child, household and commune characteristics from 
YLS data. In the equation of test scores, the explanatory variables used are child, 
household, class and school characteristics from YLSS data. The common set of 
regressors among all models includes the child’s age, a dummy for long-term health 
problems (except vision related problems due to the potential reverse impact of the 
child’s studying on it), parents’ years of schooling, the number of older siblings, 
school travel time and the asset index. The asset index, conducted by adopting the 
method used by YL (2002), represents the economic condition of a household, 
which is the simple average of 9 dummy variables for assets owned by the 
household: a television, radio, car, motorbike, bicycle, land phone, mobile phone, 
fan and computer6.  
In the school survey, most of the information about household characteristics 
was collected by interviewing students. One problem is that 20 per cent of grade 5 
children did not know their parents’ education level. In the models, parents’ 
education is represented by years of schooling, which can be regarded as an 
interaction between years of schooling and a dummy representing the fact that 
6. Using the asset index derived from the simple count method to represent household economic 
condition was found to yield consistent results as controlling for household expenditure 
(Montgomery et al. 2000), or using the index derived from the principal components analysis 
(Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov 2002; Paxson and Schady 2007) as well as from various other 
methods (Filmer and Scott 2012). 
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parents’ education is known by the child,  and a dummy for ‘Don’t know’ answers. 
Peer effects are controlled for by using information about classmates, i.e. the 
number of days absent from school and grade repetition. These variables are 
calculated by taking the mean values of interviewed children in the same class as 
the child in question. 
4.4. Empirical results7 
4.4.1. Enrolment  
The Probit estimation for school enrolment8 and the corresponding decomposition 
results are presented in Table 4.4. 
4.4.1.1. Estimation results 
In the Probit estimation for all children, the ethnicity of the child is statistically 
insignificant. The insignificance of ethnicity in the model does not imply the 
7. The estimation results of the models with using the common set of regressors are provided in 
Table A9 and Table A10. Most results are consistent with those from the models with the full 
set of regressors. 
8. An alternative method to estimate models of enrolment and SAGE by using household data is 
multi-level models, with child and commune level data. However, the nonlinear relationship 
between covariates and the depended variable leads to a difficulty in decomposition technique. 
Table A11 provides the estimation results of enrolment and SAGE from multilevel mixed effect 
Probit model. Because the estimated values of coefficients in the multilevel mixed effect Probit 
model are quite similar to those in Probit model (Table 4.4), I expect that the decomposition 
results derived from the two methods, if available, should be similar, too.  
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absence of the ethnic gap. This means that the ethnicity of a child does not 
significantly influent her (his) enrolment status when other variables are controlled 
for.  The results show that girls and younger children are more likely to go to school 
than their counterparts. Most of the variables related to household characteristics 
are found to have a significant effect on enrolment. Parents’ education and the asset 
index are positively associated with the probability of enrolment. In contrast, both 
the health shock and the newborn shock have negative effects on the enrolment rate. 
Additionally, children with more older siblings have less chance of participating in 
school. All variables representing commune characteristics have statistically 
insignificant impacts in the model. 
When enrolment is estimated separately for Kinh and non-Kinh children, the 
results for Kinh children are almost the same as those interpreted above. For non-
Kinh children, there are only three significant determinants: father’s education, 
household economic condition and the newborn baby shock. 
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 Table 4.4. Probit Models (marginal effects) and Decomposition Results for Enrolment 
 Estimation Decomposition 
 
All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained 
% 
Explained 
Minority ethnic child 0.006     
 (0.014)     
Age in months -0.002* -0.002** -0.003 0.006 -4.4 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)  
Younger cohort 0.025 -0.011 0.097 0.002 -1.2 
 (0.090) (0.099) (0.290) (0.006)  
Boy -0.019** -0.021*** 0.001 0.000 -0.0 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.034) (0.000)  
Height-for-age z score 0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.004 2.5 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.014)  
Health problem -0.002 0.029 -0.079 -0.002 1.3 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.055) (0.001)  
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All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained 
% 
Explained 
Mother's year of schooling 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005 -0.018 12.5 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.035)  
Father's years of schooling 0.005*** 0.003** 0.021*** -0.072*** 50.1 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.024)  
Older siblings -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012 -0.005 3.6 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005)  
Male head -0.008 -0.004 -0.021 -0.001 0.7 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.055) (0.004)  
Asset index 0.224*** 0.226*** 0.289** -0.050** 34.7 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.118) (0.021)  
Health shock -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.039 0.000 -0.1 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.037) (0.000)  
Newborn baby shock -0.042** -0.025 -0.097** -0.004* 2.6 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.047) (0.002)  
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All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained 
% 
Explained 
School travel time -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 1.2 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)  
Paved road in commune 0.009 0.020 0.036 -0.006 4.3 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.049) (0.009)  
Factory in commune 0.017* 0.007 0.056 -0.011 7.8 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.049) (0.011)  
Ln(population in commune) -0.001 0.013 -0.045 0.024 -16.9 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.043) (0.024)  
Total     -0.143*** 98.7 
    (0.025)  
Mean predicted enrolment probability 0.912 0.932 0.788   
Pseudo R2 0.425 0.450 0.327   
Observations 2,921 2,516 405   
Notes: Data source: 2009 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
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4.4.1.2. Decomposition results 
The decomposition result shows that 99 per cent of the ethnic gap is attributable to 
explanatory variables. Father’s education accounts for half of the difference in 
enrolment rates between Kinh and non-Kinh children. The dominant role of father’s 
education, which will be further explained in section 4.4.2.1, is partly due to its 
significant effects in the estimations for both Kinh and non-Kinh children as well 
as the large ethnic disparity in father’s education (4.7 years of schooling). Likewise, 
the fact that the asset index in majority ethnic households is almost double that in 
minority households partly explains its contribution of 35 per cent to the ethnic 
enrolment difference. A further explanation for the role of household economic 
condition in determining children’s education outcomes and the ethnic gaps will be 
provided in section 4.4.3.2. When factors are divided into three groups: the child, 
household and local characteristics, the child and local characteristics help to reduce 
the gap by 6 per cent and household characteristics contribute to the total ethnic 
enrolment gap of 105 per cent. Therefore, ethnic inequality in enrolment is mostly 
determined by ethnic differences in household characteristics, of which father’s 
education and economic condition are two dominant contributors. 
4.4.2. Schooling for age (SAGE) 
Recall that the distribution of SAGE piles up at 1 (see Figure 4.1), so SAGE is a 
censored variable. Although the Tobit model is appropriate for analysing SAGE, 
there is a limitation in the relevant decomposition technique. The method of 
decomposition for Tobit models, developed by Bauer and Sinning (2010), only 
allows the decomposition of the total gap into an explained part and an unexplained 
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part in total. Thus, the contribution of individual variables, which is the main 
interest of this research, cannot be examined. For the sake of investigating the key 
determinants of the ethnic gap in education, estimation and decomposition for 
Probit models of the modified SAGE are used.  In particular, the Probit models are 
employed to estimate the probability that a child has a SAGE index of 1. Estimation 
results are presented in Table 4.5. 
4.4.2.1. Estimation results  
Most of the estimation results for SAGE are consistent with what was found in the 
estimation for enrolment rates. The main differences follow. Ethnicity of the child 
is a significant determinant, implying that apart from explanatory variables in the 
model, unobservable factors also contribute to the ethnic differences in schooling 
for age. The height-for-age z score, despite having no impact on the child’s present 
schooling status as shown in the estimation of enrolment, positively affects 
schooling progress. The height-for-age z score represents the child’s health as a 
result of nutrition accumulation  (WHO 1997). Thus, this might link to physical as 
well as mental health, and so influence a late start or grade repetition. For example, 
Haile et al. (2016) show that there is a positive association between the height-for-
age z score and children’s test scores.  
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 Table 4.5. Probit models (marginal effects) and decomposition results for schooling for age 
 Estimation Decomposition 
 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
Minority ethnic child -0.048**     
 (0.020)     
Age in months 0.003 0.004** -0.007 0.017 -5.7 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012)  
Younger cohort 0.396*** 0.494*** -0.283 -0.005 1.8 
 (0.141) (0.149) (0.404) (0.008)  
Boy -0.031*** -0.028** -0.026 -0.000 0.1 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.042) (0.001)  
Height-for-age z score 0.024*** 0.014** 0.116*** -0.090*** 30.8 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.019)  
Health problem -0.025 -0.006 -0.120* -0.003* 1.0 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.066) (0.002)  
Mother's year of schooling 0.005*** 0.003** 0.021** -0.084** 28.7 
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 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.040)  
Father's years of schooling 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005 -0.017 5.7 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.027)  
Older siblings -0.010* -0.011* -0.018 -0.008 2.9 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007)  
Male head -0.021 -0.018 -0.031 -0.002 0.6 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.097) (0.005)  
Asset index 0.287*** 0.277*** 0.330** -0.061** 21.1 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.137) (0.025)  
Health shock -0.031** -0.034*** 0.006 -0.000 0.0 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.052) (0.000)  
Newborn baby shock -0.044* -0.058** -0.010 -0.000 0.1 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.070) (0.003)  
School travel time 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.019*** -6.5 
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 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)  
Paved road in commune 0.057*** 0.059** 0.023 -0.004 1.5 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.064) (0.012)  
Factory in commune -0.010 -0.027* 0.115* -0.025* 8.5 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.064) (0.014)  
Ln(population in commune) 0.025* 0.032** 0.079 -0.046 15.9 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.050) (0.029)  
Total    -0.310*** 106.5 
    (0.027)  
Mean predicted SAGE 0.841 0.881 0.589   
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.171 0.238   
Observations 2,921 2,516 405   
Notes: Data source: 2009 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors in parentheses
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Another difference between the estimation results for enrolment and SAGE 
is school travel time. While time to travel from home to school has no influence on 
enrolment probability, which is consistent with what was found by (Liu 2004) for 
Vietnam, it significantly increases SAGE. The positive impact of school travel time 
might result from the absence of school characteristics in the model or the self-
selection of students. For example, a good quality school, which is likely to be 
located far from home, (i) can facilitate students’ learning, and thus improve their 
SAGE index, and (ii) tend to be chosen by good students, who have high SAGE 
indexes9. The final difference between estimation results for enrolment and SAGE 
concerns the role of the local environment. In spite of being insignificant in the 
enrolment decision, variables representing commune characteristics significantly 
affect schooling progress. 
In the estimation for Kinh children only, explanatory variables exhibit a 
similar pattern of impact to those in the model for all children. For non-Kinh 
children, only the height-for-age z score, mother’s education, household economic 
condition and distance to school significantly influence their schooling progress.  
An important point emerging from comparison between estimations of 
enrolment and SAGE for non-Kinh children is the difference in the effects of father 
9. Although the absence of school characteristics might cause bias in estimated school travel time, 
this bias is believed to have minor effects on decomposition results, which are the main interest 
of this study. As shown in the decomposition results, school travel time is not an important 
contributor to the ethnic gap in schooling progress. Moreover, the estimations of maths and 
Vietnamese test score equations (Table 4.7 and Table 4.8) show that school travel time is 
insignificant when school characteristics are controlled for. 
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and mother’s education. Of the two parents’ education, only father’s years of 
schooling are significant in the equation of enrolment and only mother’s years of 
schooling can help to increase SAGE. This difference can be attributed to the fact 
that fathers are more likely to make decisions , e.g. enrolment decisions, in the 
family, especially in a low income family (Nørlund, Gates, and Vu 1995; Nguyen 
et al. 2012) like non-Kinh, and mothers are more likely to spend time helping 
children with their homework or to give them support during the studying process 
(Nørlund, Gates, and Vu 1995; Nguyen et al. 2012).10 
4.4.2.2. Decomposition results 
The total explained part accounts for 106.5 per cent of the gap in SAGE11. Over 
100 per cent of the ethnic gap explained in the model implies that unobservable 
factors help to reduce the gap by 6.5 per cent. The four main factors responsible for 
the ethnic gap are the height-for-age z score, mother’s education, economic 
condition and commune characteristics. These factors account for 31, 29, 21 and 26 
per cent of the gap, respectively. A comparison between decomposition results for 
enrolment and SAGE shows that the ethnic gap in enrolment is mostly explained 
by household characteristics, of which father’s education and household economic 
situation are the two dominant factors, while all child, household as well as 
10. In the data, 87% and 94% of the household heads are male in Kinh and non-Kinh groups, 
respectively. The proportion of younger cohort children seeing their mothers daily is 93% 
compared to 85% of them who see their fathers daily. Most of the children, 96%, have their 
mother as their primary caregiver.  
11. The decomposition for the Tobit model of SAGE shows that the total explained part accounts 
for 102% of the gap. 
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commune-related attributes contribute considerably to the gap in schooling 
progress. 
An interesting finding concerns the variation in the contribution of fathers’ 
education and mothers’ education to the ethnic gaps in enrolment and SAGE, which 
results from the variation in the impacts that fathers’ education and mothers’ 
education creates in the estimations. In particular, father’s education accounts for 
51 per cent of the ethnic gap in enrolment but only under 6 per cent in SAGE. In 
contrast, the explanatory power of mother’s education in the latter is more than 
double that in the former12.  
4.4.3. Schooling performance 
The estimation and decomposition results for multilevel models of maths and 
Vietnamese test scores are presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, respectively.  
12. To check whether this finding is driven by a high correlation between mother’s education and 
father’s education as suggested by Becker (1973) as regards assortative mating between men and 
women, education of the father and education of mother is in turn excluded from estimations 
(see Table A12 and Table A13). The results are still consistent with those when education of 
both parents are included: father’s years of schooling are the dominant factor explaining the 
enrolment gap and a minor contributor to the SAGE gap; mother’s education is insignificant in 
the enrolment gap but significantly contribute to the SAGE gap. 
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 Table 4.6. Multilevel Models and Decomposition Results for Maths Test Scores 
 Estimation Decomposition 
 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
Minority ethnic child -1.699***     
 (0.537)     
Age in month 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.101*** -0.094*** -2.1 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.031) (0.035)  
Boy -0.309** -0.326* 0.014 0.005 0.1 
 (0.157) (0.181) (0.308) (0.009)  
Health problem -0.829*** -0.994*** 0.452 -0.010 -0.2 
 (0.185) (0.192) (0.487) (0.019)  
Grade repetition -3.112*** -3.059*** -2.915*** 0.141*** 3.2 
 (0.421) (0.504) (0.568) (0.049)  
Speaking Vietnamese at home 1.023** 2.107*** 0.046 1.053*** 23.6 
 (0.427) (0.687) (0.383) (0.231)  
Mother's years of school 0.067** 0.065* 0.023 0.347*** 7.8 
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 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.072) (0.112)  
Unknown mother's education 0.408 0.257 1.317** 0.033 0.7 
 (0.351) (0.404) (0.669) (0.026)  
Father's years of school 0.048** 0.056** 0.019 0.145* 3.3 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.061) (0.079)  
Unknown father’s education 0.581** 0.745*** -0.178 0.055* 1.2 
 (0.254) (0.289) (0.605) (0.032)  
Older siblings -0.098 -0.145** 0.064 0.052* 1.2 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.122) (0.030)  
Asset index 0.249 -0.726 7.752** 0.029 0.6 
 (2.020) (2.079) (3.771) (0.042)  
School travel time -0.013 -0.026* 0.002 0.078 1.8 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.052)  
Days absent from school of 
classmates -0.775 0.104 -5.127*** 0.149** 3.3 
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 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
 (0.574) (0.572) (1.086) (0.066)  
Grade repetition of classmates -7.990* -6.970* -13.278** 0.273*** 6.1 
 (4.248) (3.967) (6.155) (0.057)  
Class size -0.025 -0.054 -0.266** -0.066 -1.5 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.127) (0.154)  
Television in classroom 2.005** 2.381*** 13.993*** 0.182*** 4.1 
 (0.845) (0.789) (2.311) (0.039)  
Dropout at school -2.363 -2.259* -3.124 0.384*** 8.6 
 (1.584) (1.278) (3.137) (0.076)  
School size 0.166*** 0.198*** 0.300 0.648*** 14.5 
 (0.056) (0.044) (0.248) (0.082)  
Constant 10.048*** 11.547*** 3.327   
 (2.563) (2.824) (5.150)   
Total     3.404 76.3 
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  Estimation Decomposition 
 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
Mean predicted Maths score 14.454 18.883 13.875   
Ln(δv) 0.670** 0.333 1.406***   
 (0.293) (0.317) (0.147)   
Ln(δu) 0.901*** 0.837*** -13.172   
 (0.134) (0.122) (24.467)   
Ln(δε) 1.390*** 1.399*** 1.238***   
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.068)   
Observations 3,218 2,831 387   
Notes: Data source: 2011-2012 YLSS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors in the decomposition 
results are bootstrapped with 1000 replications 
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 Table 4.7. Multilevel Models and Decomposition Results for Vietnamese Test Scores 
 Estimation Decomposition 
 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
Minority ethnic child -1.589***     
 (0.452)     
Age in month 0.054*** 0.064*** 0.028 -0.089*** -1.9 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.032)  
Boy -1.229*** -1.284*** -0.701** 0.018 0.4 
 (0.160) (0.176) (0.340) (0.035)  
Health problem -0.557*** -0.604*** -0.277 -0.007 -0.1 
 (0.181) (0.181) (0.575) (0.013)  
Grade repetition -2.601*** -2.816*** -1.032* 0.118*** 2.5 
 (0.445) (0.533) (0.571) (0.042)  
Speaking Vietnamese at home 1.979*** 2.351*** 1.465** 1.627*** 34.8 
 (0.462) (0.637) (0.664) (0.237)  
Mother's years of school 0.063*** 0.054** 0.023 0.330*** 7.1 
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  Estimation Decomposition 
 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.073) (0.108)  
Unknown mother's education 0.308 0.073 1.104 0.026 0.6 
 (0.340) (0.333) (1.029) (0.023)  
Father's years of school 0.084*** 0.094*** 0.088 0.257*** 5.5 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.077) (0.077)  
Unknown father’s education 1.138*** 1.392*** -0.275 0.104*** 2.2 
 (0.311) (0.319) (0.738) (0.036)  
Older siblings -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.244** 0.103*** 2.2 
 (0.070) (0.080) (0.115) (0.035)  
Asset index 0.561 0.190 5.443* 0.046 1.0 
 (1.653) (1.729) (3.081) (0.040)  
School travel time 0.005 0.003 0.013 -0.011 -0.2 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.047)  
Days absent from school of classmates -0.802 -0.266 -2.566** 0.154** 3.3 
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  Estimation Decomposition 
 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
 (0.504) (0.589) (1.115) (0.065)  
Grade repetition of classmates -3.083 -1.937 -0.872 0.118** 2.5 
 (2.999) (3.072) (4.349) (0.046)  
Class size -0.010 -0.031 -0.074 0.090 1.9 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.078) (0.150)  
Television in classroom 0.917 1.156 8.327*** 0.078** 1.7 
 (0.745) (0.734) (1.884) (0.035)  
Dropout at school -0.345 0.337 -2.192** 0.060 1.3 
 (0.980) (1.140) (1.061) (0.052)  
School size 0.139*** 0.160*** 0.197 0.543*** 11.6 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.152) (0.076)  
Constant 10.811*** 9.817*** 10.841***   
 (2.443) (2.684) (3.544)   
Total     3.567 76.4 
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 All Kinh Non-Kinh Explained % Explained 
Mean predicted Vietnamese scores 20.281 20.897 16.196   
Ln(δv) 0.368 0.262 0.981***   
 (0.246) (0.228) (0.156)   
Ln(δu) 0.551*** 0.522*** -15.038   
 (0.102) (0.096) (41.481)   
Ln(δε) 1.363*** 1.364*** 1.287***   
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.053)   
Observations 3,218 2,831 387   
Notes: Data source: 2011-2012 YLSS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors in the decomposition results are 
bootstrapped with 1000 replications
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4.4.3.1. Estimation results 
The estimation results for maths and Vietnamese test scores are quite similar. After 
controlling for other variables, there are significant ethnic gaps in test scores. In 
particular, both maths and Vietnamese test scores for Kinh children are, on average, 
over 1.6 point higher than those for non-Kinh children. Factors consistently 
reducing the scores are male students, health problems, number of siblings and 
grade repetition of classmates. Variables that help to improve test scores are 
speaking Vietnamese at home and parents’ education13.  
Random effects in the multilevel estimations show the contribution of 
between-group differences to the total unexplained variance in test scores. In 
general, class random effects are stronger than school random effects and between-
group differences in maths test scores account for a larger share than those of 
Vietnamese test scores. In particular, 29 and 25 per cent of the total residual 
variance in the maths test scores is due to between-class and school differences, 
respectively. For Vietnamese test scores, the comparable figures are 22 and 19 per 
cent, respectively. 
13. The positive sign of the dummy variable for parents’ education that is unknown, despite being 
insignificant in some cases, shows that parents’ education unknown by children has a stronger 
influence on test scores than that known by children. A further investigation shows that Kinh 
and older children, and children speaking Vietnamese at home, are less likely to know their 
parents’ education (Table A14). Hence, the stronger impact of unknown parents’ education 
might be partly due to a positive association between test scores and Kinh ethnicity, age in 
month, and speaking Vietnamese at home. 
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Two remarkable differences between the estimation results for Kinh and non-
Kinh children, which are relevant for policy, concern the impacts of the household 
economic situation and the child characteristics. First, the asset index, despite 
playing no role in the equation for Kinh children, consistently increases the test 
scores of non-Kinh children. This finding implies that it is possible to progress the 
performance of minority children at school by improving their household economic 
condition, given the fact that ethnic minorities still heavily suffer from poverty. 
Second, most of the variables related to the child characteristics have strong impacts 
on test scores of Kinh children but slightly, even insignificantly, affect learning 
outcomes of non-Kinh children. This suggests that the education system that Kinh 
children experience allows them to make use of their personality traits in the 
learning process, resulting in a strong association between children’s characteristics 
and learning outcomes. Non-Kinh children, however, seem to study in a 
disadvantaged educational environment, in which personal characteristics play a 
minor role in students’ performance. Instead, the test scores of non-Kinh children 
are likely to be determined by external factors, e.g. household economic condition, 
peer, class and school effects. Hence, the obstacles to minority children obtaining 
high test scores are not internal factors, e.g. their characteristics, but disadvantages 
related to the external factors including the educational environment.   
4.4.3.2. Decomposition results 
The decomposition results show that the models can explain approximately 73 and 
75 per cent of the ethnic gaps in maths and Vietnamese test scores, respectively. 
There are four groups of variables that mainly contribute to the gaps: use of the 
Vietnamese language, parents’ education, peer effects, and class and school 
83 
 
Chapter 4. Ethnic gaps in education outcomes 
 
characteristics. The role of the four groups in explaining the ethnic gaps differs 
between maths and Vietnamese. For maths scores, the decomposition results show 
that the two most important factors explaining the ethnic gap are class and school 
characteristics and speaking Vietnamese at home, individually responsible for 
around 21 and 25 per cent of the ethnic gap, respectively. The remaining gap is 
attributable to parents’ education, 13 per cent, peer effect, 12 per cent. For 
Vietnamese test scores, the largest contributor to the ethnic gap is the use of the 
Vietnamese language, which explains more than one third of the gap. This is 
followed by parents’ education, approximately 16 per cent, school characteristics 
and peer effects, which together account for 19 per cent of the gap.  
Recall that most of the child characteristics are insignificant in the estimation 
of test scores for the non-Kinh group. Correspondingly, they negligibly explain the 
ethnic gap in decomposition. Therefore, in order that minority ethnic children catch 
up with their majority peers at school, the relevant policy should focus on the 
external factors, e.g. the four groups of contributors that are mostly responsible for 
the ethnic disparity in education performance. 
Finally, there is a noticeable decline in the contribution of the household 
economic situation and parents’ education to the ethnic gaps in test scores compared 
to that in enrolment and SAGE. Specifically, the asset index explains over a third 
of the enrolment gap, over a fifth of the SAGE gap and insignificantly contributes 
to the test score gaps. Similarly, the explanatory power of both parents’ years of 
schooling together is 63, 34 and around 15 per cent in the models of enrolment, 
SAGE and test scores, respectively. A possible reason for the variation in the 
contribution of economic condition as well as parents’ education is the conceptual 
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difference between education outcomes under examination. School enrolment, for 
example, is likely to be related to a household’s decision on whether to invest in the 
child’s human capital. Hence, such a decision is considerably determined by 
characteristics of the main decision maker in the household, e.g. a father’s 
education, and household economic situation, e.g. the asset index. However, 
whether the child can maintain proper progress at school, represented by SAGE, is 
affected by other additional factors, such as learning support from the family or a 
certain effort of the child to pass the exams. Thus, for schooling progress, mother’s 
characteristics are more relevant than father’s characteristics, and the asset index 
becomes less important. When the child has enrolled in school, there is a number 
of determinants of their performance. For example, apart from the student effort 
and support from family, peer and school attributes also unduly influence learning 
outcomes. In this context, the roles of household economic condition and parents’ 
education are further diminished. 
4.5. Summary of main findings and policy implications  
This paper has investigated primary factors contributing to the education gap 
between minority and majority ethnic children in Vietnam. The gaps in enrolment, 
schooling progress and performance were documented and explained through data 
from the 2009 YLS and 2011-2012 YLSS. The impacts that explanatory variables 
exert on a child’s education vary according to education outcomes and ethnic 
groups. Some remarkable variations follow. Since fathers and mothers play 
different roles in the family, especially in minority families, they have strikingly 
different effects on their child’s education. In particular, the father’s education has 
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a positive effect on enrolment of non-Kinh children and only mother’s education 
can help to increase SAGE. Poverty is still an obstacle to minority children 
obtaining high test scores. Furthermore, for Kinh children, most of the variables 
related to the child characteristics significantly affect their test scores. For non-Kinh 
children, however, their performance is likely to be determined by external factors, 
e.g. household economic condition, home support, peer, class and school effects, 
rather than their own characteristics. This finding suggests that the factors mainly 
driving the poor performance of minority children are not their own internal 
attributes, but disadvantages related to the external determinants.  
To identify the key contributors to ethnic inequality, the paper decomposed 
education gaps between minority and majority ethnic children. The results showed 
that the key factors contributing to the gaps are different, depending on the type of 
education outcomes under examination. While ethnic differences in enrolment are 
entirely explained by variables in the model, around 10 and 20 per cent of the 
difference in schooling progress and performance are unexplained, respectively. 
For the enrolment gap, household characteristics are the dominant explanatory 
factors. However, all child, household and commune attributes are responsible for 
the gap in schooling progress. Consistent with the insignificance of the child 
characteristics in the estimation for the non-Kinh group, such characteristics only 
negligibly explain the test score gaps in decomposition results. Instead, the test 
score gaps are attributable to the ethnic differences in parent’s education, the use of 
the Vietnamese language, peer and school characteristics.  
There are interesting findings relating to the variation in the contribution of 
explanatory factors to the ethnic gaps. First, father’s education is the largest 
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contributor to the enrolment gap and only plays a minor role in the SAGE gap. In 
contrast, the role of mother’s education is much more important in the latter than in 
the former. Second, the explanatory power of household economic condition is the 
largest in the enrolment gap, followed by schooling progress and test scores. 
The findings on the variation in the role of determinants suggest efforts to 
narrow the ethnic gaps in education should vary the focus and priority according to 
the targeted outcomes. For example, improving household economic condition 
might be relevant to narrowing the enrolment and schooling progress gaps, but in 
order to equalize education performance across the ethnic groups, increase 
Vietnamese language skill among minority ethnic children and improving school 
quality are more important.  
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5. Do more educated neighbourhoods experience less 
property crime? Evidence from Indonesia 
5.1. Introduction 
The incidence of crime in Indonesia has considerably decreased in recent years. For 
example, data from Indonesia Social and Economic Surveys (Susenas) show that 
the share of Indonesians being a victim of crime in the population fell from 3.8 per 
cent in 2007 to 1.2 per cent in 2012. Reports from the national police headquarters 
demonstrate that the number of criminals per 100,000 Indonesians declined from 
145 to 134 in the same period (BPS 2010, 2013). This decreasing trend in the levels 
of crime in Indonesia seems to be surprising, given limited capacity 
and insufficiency of the police force. The number of police per 100,000 Indonesian 
people is 161 officers, which is just half of the number in the neighbouring country, 
Thailand (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as cited by BMI 2017). And 
perhaps more importantly, severe corruption among the police force and judiciary 
is a major obstacle to the fight against criminals. The police force is believed to be 
the most corrupt among public institutions. According to Transparency 
International organization, 91 per cent of Indonesians state that police are corrupt 
or extremely corrupt and the percentage for the judiciary is 86 per cent (TI 2013). 
Education levels of Indonesians have consistently improved over time. For 
instance, gross and net enrolment rates for secondary school over the period 2007-
2012 rose by 10 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, and the proportion of 
population aged 15 and above with secondary education increased from 27 per cent 
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to 32 per cent (BPS 2018). Given evidence of the crime reducing impact of 
education found recently in developed countries such as Sweden (Hjalmarsson, 
Holmlund, and Lindquist 2015), United Kingdom (Machin, Marie, and Vujić 2011) 
and the United States (Anderson 2014; Bell, Costa, and Machin 2016; Lochner and 
Moretti 2004), it is reasonable to ask whether education exerts a similar impact in 
a developing country such as Indonesia, where law enforcement tends to be weaker 
and the average education level of the population lower than in developed countries. 
The more specific question is whether the improvement in education level causally 
connects to the reduction in the incidence of crime experienced by people in the 
country during the period 2007-2012. 
Recent research establishes that education is able to diminish crime through 
different channels. For example, education yields an incapacitation effect on crime, 
especially juvenile crime. An adolescent enrolling in school has less chance of 
being involved in illegal activities. Supporting evidence of the incapacitation effect 
was found by Bell, Costa, and Machin (2016). They showed that a longer period of 
compulsory schooling significantly reduced the crime rate in the United States 
between 1980 and 2010. Similarly, the expansion of school hours by 30 per cent as 
a result of a 1997 school reform in Chile led to a decline in all types of youth crimes 
(Berthelon and Kruger 2011).  
There is also suggestive evidence of other channels, in addition to 
incapacitation, through which education mitigates crime. For example, the change 
in a conditional cash transfer program in Brazil, which made households with 16-
17 year old adolescents enrolling in school eligible for the transfer benefit, helped 
to lower crime incidents on both school days and non-school days (Chioda, De 
89 
 
Chapter 5. Crime reducing effect of education 
 
Mello, and Soares 2016). Lochner and Moretti (2004) suggest that education is able 
to decrease crime through preference or income channels. In particular, education 
increases people’s aversion to illegal and risky behaviours, and raises the 
opportunity cost of crime by creating high potential earnings from lawful activities. 
Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2012) showed, for instance, that a post-compulsory 
education policy in the United Kingdom resulted in both a decrease in crime 
convictions and an increase in the earnings for those affected by the policy. 
However, the income effect generated by education might also escalate crime by 
creating high returns to illegal activities (Campaniello, Gray, and Mastrobuoni 
2016). Another important channel of impact is the peer effect (Lochner 2011): 
educated people tend to have well educated friends and colleagues while dropouts 
are more likely to interact with offenders. In this context, McAdams (2016) found 
that children who were exposed to older classmates were less likely to commit a 
crime as adults, and Deming (2011) concluded that a student’s own illegal 
behaviour was significantly associated with her or his delinquent peers. 
A key challenge to estimating the effect of education on crime is isolating the 
causal relationship, which seems to be confounded by unobservable determinants. 
They include an individual’s characteristics such as impatience, returns to crime, 
ability, attitude toward risk (Lochner and Moretti 2004) or other confounders such 
as economic shocks and changes in the legal framework. An additional issue 
associated with identifying the causal relationship concerns the reverse causal 
effects that unlawful behaviours might impose on educational attainment 
(Hjalmarsson 2008; Webbink et al. 2012). For instance, juvenile delinquency 
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significantly reduces the chance of high school and college graduation (Ward and 
Williams 2015). 
To overcome these issues, some studies have successfully exploited variation 
in education related policies as a source of an exogenous shock to education 
outcomes. In this regard, the most used educational policy in the literature is that of 
compulsory schooling. Minimum years required in school, for instance, were used 
to instrument years of schooling by Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Bell, Costa, 
and Machin (2016) for the United States, and Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, and 
Lindquist (2015) for Sweden. Likewise, the minimum school leaving age was made 
use of by Anderson (2014)  and Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2011). The former 
adopted a triple difference approach to panel data at the county level in the United 
States, and the latter employed the regression discontinuity method to establish the 
variation in education outcomes as a result of the change in the minimum school 
leaving age from 15 to 16 in England and Wales. All aforementioned papers reached 
conclusive findings related to a negative association between education and crime. 
Cook and Kang (2016) employed the regulation on school entry cut-off date in the 
United States, which caused a delay in entering school for children born just after 
the cut-off date. The author demonstrated that people born just after the cut-off date 
tended to perform better in school compared to their younger classmates and thus 
were less likely to commit youth crime. However, these late start students were 
more likely to commit adult crime due to a higher probability of dropout in the last 
years of high school. Similarly, McAdams (2016) explained the variation in 
education outcomes and the probability of incarceration as a result of the regulation 
on school starting age. The author suggested that raising school starting age would 
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lower the incarceration rates. Programs related to education have also been 
exploited to explore the causal impact on crime. For instance, Amin et al. (2016) 
used Job Corps, a national program providing education and vocational training to 
disadvantaged youth in the United States, and Deming (2011) employed a public 
school choice lottery program that gave students the chance of entering their first 
choice school. Both found that these programs were positively associated with 
education outcomes and thus mitigated crime. 
However, there are several potential gaps in the existing literature. First, an 
acknowledged limitation of studies using external shocks, for example education 
related policies, is that the estimated results can only identify the treatment effect 
locally (Greenstone and Gallagher 2008; Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001). 
Second, the research so far has addressed the question by using data from police 
reports or the self reports of criminals, which are likely to be underreported due to 
the exclusion of unarrested criminals or unreported crime incidents. Finally, most 
of the previous studies were set in the developed country context14. The impact of 
education on crime, especially property crime, might be different in developing 
countries, where law enforcement tends to be weaker, poverty higher and the 
average education level of the population lower than in developed countries.  
14. An exception is provided by Berthelon and Kruger (2011) for Chile. Chioda, De Mello, and 
Soares (2016) also looked at the impact of a conditional cash transfer program on crime in Brazil. 
However, the result could not be interpreted as the causal effect of education on crime because 
apart from improving education, the program also increased the incomes of benefited 
households, which likely, in turn, affected crime. Jonck et al. (2015) found inconclusive results 
relating to the effect of education on crime in South Africa. 
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Chapter 5 focuses on examining the causal effect of education on the levels 
of property crime at the district level in Indonesia. More precisely, the chapter 
estimates how the education level of people living in a district affects the property 
crime victimisation rate, defined as the share of people being a victim of property 
crime in the district population. Hence, information on crime comes from self-
reports of individuals who were victims of crimes rather than from police or 
offender sources. Education, in addition to mitigating criminal activities, also helps 
to prevent criminal victimisation (Hussin and Zawawi 2012). Highly educated 
people, for example, probably know good ways to protect themselves from crime 
and help other neighbours to avoid being victims of crime. However, educated 
people could earn high incomes and thus tend to be a target of property crime 
(Carvalho and Lavor 2008). At the district level, living among well-educated 
neighbours, who are unlikely involved in illegal activities, might reduce the 
probability of becoming victimised.   
The analysis exploits household data from the 2007-2012 Indonesian 
National Social Economy Survey (Susenas) to create district level panel data. Then, 
the difference generalised method of moments is adopted to address the 
endogeneity of education and take into account the dynamics of crime. Property 
crime, rather than other types of crime, is the focus of this study because over 90 
per cent of crime reported in Susenas is property crime. Moreover, conflict related 
and violent crime, which seem to account for the majority of other crime types15, 
15. Using data from the 2012 Indonesia National Violence Monitoring System (SNPK), I find that 
conflicts trigger 70% of crime unrelated to violence and 33% of crime related violence. SNPK 
data were downloaded from  
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does not solely stem from economic motivations but also from social and political 
drives. As stated by Kelly (2000), property crime can be plausibly interpreted by 
economic theory, but violent crime should be examined using social theory, which 
is beyond the scope of this research. 
I find a robust result concerning a negative association between education and 
property crime in Indonesia. In particular, a one year increase in schooling of the 
population in a district leads to around a one percentage point reduction in the crime 
victimisation rate. Primary education appears to play no role in mitigating crime 
but secondary and higher education does help to alleviate crime. In line with 
previous research, the results demonstrate a stronger effect of education on crime 
for males than females. The analyses also provide suggestive evidence of the 
incapacitation effect for school age children. Further investigation into the variation 
of the impact shows that extreme poverty weakens the impact of education on 
crime.  
The present paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Both dynamics 
of crime and endogeneity of education are taken into account by applying difference 
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2626/get_microdata  
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GMM16 to panel data. Also, the present study explores the topic from a different 
angle, victims of crime rather than criminals, thus contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding about the relationship between education and crime. Additionally, 
this paper stands among the few contributions that estimate the effect of education 
on crime using community level data. It examines the effect of education on crime 
in a developing country context, which has so far been inadequately studied.  
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper identifying the 
causal relationship between education and crime in Indonesia. A number of 
previous studies for Indonesia have focused on violence caused by conflicts (Bazzi 
and Gudgeon 2016; Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan 2009; Barron and Sharpe 2008; 
De Juan, Pierskalla, and Vüllers 2015; Mansoob Murshed, Zulfan Tadjoeddin, and 
Chowdhury 2009; Pierskalla and Sacks 2017; Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007). Two 
empirical studies related to crime in the country were those conducted by Cameron 
and Shah (2013), who investigated how errors in allocating the funds of a poverty 
program drove crime, and by Hendri and Muharja (2013), who established the 
16. Buonanno and Leonida (2006) adopted system GMM to investigate the impact of education on 
crime in Italy. However, the empirical analysis was conducted by using a small sample of 20 
cross sectional observations in 15 periods of time, for which system GMM might yield invalid 
results. As noted by Blundell and Bond (1998), system GMM is applicable to panel data with 
short time periods and long cross sections. Moreover, to apply system GMM instead of 
difference GMM, an additional assumption need to be made: the first differences of endogenous 
regressors are uncorrelated with the unobservable fixed effect, which seems to be invalid when 
the time invariant characteristics of districts are likely to affect changes in both education and 
crime. 
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impact of poverty and inequality on crime. However, neither of them considered 
education as an explanatory variable of crime.  
5.2. Data 
Many of the data used in this paper are taken from the 2007-2012 Indonesia Social 
and Economic Surveys (Susenas), conducted by Indonesia’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics (BPS) to collect social and economic information about households, 
including demography, health, education, housing, expenditure and participation in 
poverty alleviation programs. The data are representative at the district level. The 
sample size of the 2007-2012 Susenas is presented in Panel A, Table 5
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 Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
A. Sample 
 
Number of individuals 1,167,019      1,142,675  1,155,566  1,178,493  1,117,827  1,114,445  
Number of households 285,186         282,387  291,753  293,715  285,186  286,113  
Number of districts 454 456 471 497 497 497 
B. Crime       
Crime victimisation rate (%) 3.8 3.12 1.51 1.29 1.24 1.02 
Property crime victimisation rate (%) 3.56 2.97 1.41 1.21 1.18 0.93 
Share of females in  property crime victims 45.91 45.4 37.33 35.56 36.24 37.12 
Share of children under 18 in  property crime victims 28 26 13 11 14 14 
Crime reported rate (%) 
  
16.77 19.45 18.62 17.01 
C. Education 
 
Years of schooling, population aged 7+ 7.31 7.33 7.58 7.67 7.68 7.85 
Years of schooling, population aged 15+ 7.91 7.99 8.22 8.38 8.38 8.58 
Years of schooling, females aged 15+ 7.41 7.54 7.76 7.96 7.98 8.17 
Years of schooling, males aged 15+ 8.42 8.45 8.7 8.81 8.79 8.98 
Share of population aged 15+ without qualifications 23.01 23.22 22.36 20.01 21.1 19.78 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Share of females aged 15+ without qualifications 27.21 26.67 26.12 23.52 24.57 23.09 
Share of males aged 15+ without qualifications 18.68 19.66 18.39 16.44 17.58 16.46 
Share of population aged 15+ with primary education  30.43 29.08 29.31 29.72 28.72 28.09 
Share of population aged 15+ with junior secondary education 19.83 20.23 19.85 20.57 20.74 21 
Share of population aged 15+ with senior secondary education 20.7 21.77 22.09 22.83 22.72 23.97 
Share of population aged 15+ with university education  6.03 5.69 6.4 6.87 6.73 7.16 
Enrolment rate of population aged 7-18 (%) 84.22 84.41 85 85.56 86.41 87.81 
D. Control variables (mean values) 
 
Population in the districts 496,519    500,515  486,965  478,157  486,014  493,839  
Share of males aged 15-25 in districts 19.4 18.86 18.61 18.36 18.32 17.99 
Share urban population in districts 34.57 38.23 37.3 37.22 37.26 37.35 
Per capita expenditure in districts 297,355  427,403  428,588  473,131  559,154  616,177  
Poverty rate in districts 22.77 20.84 19.8 18.47 17.96 17.18 
GDP growth rate of districts 5.33 6.61 5.23 5.97 6.36 5.86 
Gini index of districts 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.34 
Data sources: 2007-2012 Susenas and INDO-DAPOER
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With regard to information on crime, Susenas includes a question asking if 
respondents were victims of crime in the last 12 months. Depending on the year of 
survey, crime is categorised into theft, burglary, murder, fraud, rape, robbery and 
others. The definition of property crime used in the paper is, however, unchanged 
over time to include theft, burglary, fraud and robbery. Since 2009, there has been 
a question asking if the incident was reported to police. Panel B in Table 5.1 shows 
some descriptive statistics of crime experienced by Indonesians during the period 
2007-2012. The shares of the population being a victim of crime (crime 
victimisation rate) decreased considerably over time. In 2007, 3.8 per cent of the 
population were victims of crime, which fell to 1 per cent in 2012. More than 90 
per cent of the incidents were property crime. Females were less likely to be a target 
of property crime than males, and the share of female victims tended to decrease 
over the period. The percentage of property crime victims under 18 year old, despite 
declining remarkably by half during the period, was still high, at 14 per cent in 
2012. Among victims, only less than 20 per cent reported the incidents to police. 
The low reporting rate partly explains a factor of eight difference between the 
numbers of self-reported victims in Susenas and crime incidents released by 
Indonesia’s Criminal Police Head Quarters17. This also confirms that the volume of 
crime is, indeed, underreported in police data, thus providing a justification for my 
use of victim data. 
Concerning education, household members aged 5 and above are asked about 
the highest education level and the corresponding grade that they have completed 
17. Data from Criminal Police Head Quarters show that the crime rate, measured by the number of 
crime incidents per 100.000 Indonesians, was 134 in 2012. 
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or are currently undertaking. This information enables the construction of a variable 
identifying the exact years of schooling without measurement errors caused by 
grade repetition. Panel C, Table 5.1 shows an improvement in the education levels 
of Indonesians, mostly resulting from a sizable increase in the educational 
attainment of the younger generation during the period. In particular, the average 
years of schooling completed by Indonesians rose by 0.54 years over the period. A 
decline in the Indonesian population without educational qualifications or with 
primary education coincided with a continuous rise in the share of the population 
with junior secondary education or above. Comparing education levels between 
genders, males, on average, had more years of schooling and higher qualifications 
than females. Among the school age population, the enrolment rates were also 
increasing regularly over time. Overall, Table 5.1 indicates that the improvement 
in education was concurrent with the decline in crime during the period. 
Nevertheless, this only refers to the negative correlation between the two issues. 
The next sections will identify the causal effect of education on the incidence of 
crime in the country. 
In addition to Susenas data, the empirical analysis also employs data from The 
Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER), which 
contains economic and social indicators at the district level. 
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5.3. Empirical strategy  
5.3.1. Model specification 
In the empirical analyses, the incidence of crime in a district is measured by the 
property crime victimisation rate, defined as the number of individuals being a 
victim of property crime per 100 people18. The specific model that estimates the 
effect of education on crime is as follows. 
tiittitititi uTXEVV ,,,21,10, ++++++= − εγαβββ  (5.1) 
 Where tiV ,  and tiE ,  are the property crime victimisation rate and education 
level of the population in district i in year t, respectively; 1, −tiV is the property crime 
victimisation rate in district i in year t-1; T is a vector of dummy variables 
controlling for time effects; tiX ,  is a vector representing the characteristics of 
district i in year t; iε  is unobservable fixed factors and tiu ,  is unobservable time 
variant factors. The characteristics of a district include poverty rates and per capita 
expenditure, which are relevant to economically motivated crime and GDP growth 
rate and urbanization19, which represent the development level of the district. The 
Gini index, calculated from per capita expenditure of households within a district, 
is added in the model due to recent evidence of correlation between inequality and 
crime in Indonesia (Cameron and Shah 2013; Hendri and Muharja 2013) as well as 
other countries (Brush 2007; Kelly 2000). Finally, as suggested by previous 
18. BPS (2013) uses the same definition to report crime victims. 
19. Data on poverty, GDP and urbanization are taken from Indonesia Database for Policy and 
Economic Research (DAPOER), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=1266 
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research using community level data to estimate crime (Anderson 2014; Raphael 
and Winter-Ebmer 2001), demographic factors such as the size of the population 
and the share of males aged 15-25 are included in the model. The descriptive 
statistics of the control variables are presented in Panel D, Table 5.1. 
Model (1) is a dynamic panel model, which is relevant to an analysis of crime 
because the amount of crime in the present is likely to be determined by the levels 
in the past (Lochner and Moretti 2004). First, from a criminal perspective, 
undetected illegal activities in the past might encourage offenders to commit further 
unlawful activities.  Second, criminals could accumulate skills and raise returns to 
crime over time, thus making crime increasingly attractive to them. Third, 
accumulated skills might also help criminals reduce the probability of being 
arrested, and as a result, making them persistently commit crimes (Buonanno and 
Leonida 2006). Finally, from a victim perspective, a person who used to be a victim 
of crime might learn from the experience to protect themselves better in the future.  
5.3.2. Endogeneity  
The estimated coefficient of the education variable in equation (5.1) might be biased 
due to unobservable factors, such as traditional and cultural factors, that affect both 
the incidence of crime and education level of people in the district. Taking the 
advantage of the district level panel data, equation (5.1) is differenced to eliminate 
unobservable fixed factors iε . 
tittitititi uTXEVV ,,,21,1, ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ − γαββ  (5.2) 
However, the first difference transformation of a dynamic equation, as in 
equation (5.2), raises another source of endogeneity. Specifically, on the right hand 
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side of equation (5.2) 1, −∆ tiV and error terms tiu ,∆  are correlated due to correlation 
between 1, −tiV and 1, −tiu . That is 
0),cov(),cov( 1,,2,1,,1, ≠−−=∆∆ −−−− titititititi uuVVuV . 
In dynamic panel model (1), 1, −tiV is assumed to be a predetermined variable, 
implying 0),cov( ,1, =+− stiti uV  for Ts ,...,1,0= s. This assumption can be interpreted 
as that the current and future disturbances have no effect on the levels of crime in 
the past. Given unobservable fixed factors being removed, the lags two onward of 
the crime variable, such as 2, −tiV , 3, −tiV , satisfy the relevant and exclusion 
conditions, and therefore, can be used to instrument 1, −∆ tiV . In particular, the lags 
seem to be (i) highly correlated with the crime variable on the right hand side of 
equation (5.2), 0),cov(),cov( 2,1,2,1,2, ≠−=∆ −−−−− tititititi VVVVV , and (ii) uncorrelated 
with the composition of the error terms, 0),cov(),cov( 1,,2,,2, =−=∆ −−− tititititi uuVuV
, under the assumption that 1, −tiV  is a predetermined variable. 
Education in equation (5.1) also potentially suffers from endogeneity due to 
unobservable time variant factors. For example, changes in the legal framework or 
the enhancement of law enforcement might make criminal behaviour less attractive 
compared to education for teenage delinquents; or shocks in the labour market, such 
as an increase in returns to education, also affect relative preference between 
education and illegal activities. In this case, the first difference transformation of 
equation (5.1), as shown in equation (5.2), fails to solve the problem of endogeneity 
because tiE ,∆ and tiu ,∆  on the right hand side of equation (5.2) are correlated. With 
the same explanation as that for crime, the lags two onward of education seem to 
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be valid instrumentals for tiE ,∆ . In particular, the current and future shocks are 
unlikely to affect education levels in the past, so 
0),cov(),cov( 1,,2,,2, =−=∆ −−− tititititi uuEuE ;  and the education level of the 
population as a whole is accumulated over periods of time, so 
0),cov(),cov( 1,,2,,2, ≠−=∆ −−− tititititi EEEEE . The instrumental variable 
estimation of equation (5.2) can be obtained by using the generalised method of 
moments.  
The approach that adopts the generalised method of moments to estimate a 
dynamic panel model with endogenous explanatory and predetermined variables in 
differenced form instrumented by their lagged values is known as the difference 
generalised method of moments (difference GMM) (Arellano and Bond 1991; 
Roodman 2009). Difference GMM was designed for models with a large number 
of cross sectional observations and short time periods.  
5.3.3. Tests for validity of instrumental variables and robustness of 
estimation results 
Along with the difference GMM estimators of crime, various tests are conducted to 
verify the validity of instrumental variables (Roodman 2009). The Sargan and 
Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions are used to test the null hypothesis that 
instrumental variables are jointly exogenous. Another test concerning the 
exogenous condition of instrumental variables, which especially applies to 
difference GMM estimations, is that of no serial correlation of order one between 
error terms in the original equation, equation (5.1). If the null hypothesis is not 
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rejected, then the second lag of the crime victimisation rates, 2, −tiV , can be used to 
instrument its first lag in differenced form, 1, −∆ tiV , in equation (5.2)20.  
Roodman (2009) acknowledged the potential bias of difference GMM in 
finite samples, especially when the number of instrumental variables is large. 
According to Roodman (2009), a large set of instruments is likely to weaken the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions as well as overfit endogenous 
explanatory variables. To address this issues, the number of instrumental variables 
is reduced by using the collapsed lags two to four of the crime and education 
variables to instrument their differenced form. This set of instrumental variables is 
also employed as the main specification in the empirical analysis. In addition, 
various combinations of lags are used to check the sensitivity of estimation results.  
5.4. Empirical results 
5.4.1. Benchmark estimations 
This section discusses the full estimation results by interpreting the effects of 
education and other covariates on property crime victimisation rates. Collapsed lags 
two to four of the variables in level are used to instrument the endogenous variables 
in the differenced form and Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction is adopted 
20. Since equation (5.2) is the first difference transformation of equation (5.1), no serial correlation 
of order 1 between error terms in (1) implies no serial correlation of order two in equation (5.2). 
Alternatively, 0),cov( 1,, =−titi uu  in (4.1) is equivalent to
0),cov(),cov( 3,2,1,,2,, =−−=∆∆ −−−− titititititi uuuuuu  in (4.2). 
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to generate robust standard errors. The education variable in the benchmark 
estimations and in most other estimations is years of schooling of the population 
aged 15 and above. Recall that years of schooling derived from Susenas do not 
include grade repetition, so they indicate the exact educational attainment of the 
population in year. The population aged 15 and above is the focus of attention 
because people in this age group are more likely to be involved in crime incidents. 
Nevertheless, the estimation results using other indicators of education and for 
different groups of population are presented in next sections. The point estimates 
and associated standard errors of education and other control variables are presented 
in Table 5.2. Only time effect is controlled for in column 1; demographic factors 
are included in column 2; economic variables are added in column 3; and column 4 
displays the full model.  
Table 5.2. Benchmark estimations 
Victim rate  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged victim rate 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Years of schooling, aged 
15+ 
-0.854** -0.853*** -0.929** -0.932*** 
(0.335) (0.330) (0.365) (0.352) 
Year = 2009 -1.326*** -1.344*** -1.310*** -1.329*** 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.115) 
Year = 2010 -0.932*** -0.979*** -0.989*** -1.045*** 
 (0.226) (0.216) (0.224) (0.210) 
Year = 2011 -1.177*** -1.245*** -1.461*** -1.549*** 
 (0.167) (0.158) (0.155) (0.151) 
Year = 2012 -1.244*** -1.330*** -1.606*** -1.714*** 
 (0.216) (0.203) (0.195) (0.184) 
Ln(population)  0.944***  1.127*** 
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Victim rate  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  (0.360)  (0.371) 
Urban population (%)  0.005  0.004 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%)  -0.009  -0.010 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Ln(per capita 
expenditure)   0.770** 0.788** 
   (0.366) (0.368) 
Gini   1.791** 1.854** 
   (0.873) (0.869) 
Poverty (%)   0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth (%)   0.002 0.002 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of instruments21 10 13 14 17 
Sargan test (p value) 0.655 0.563 0.723 0.607 
Hansen test (p value) 0.542 0.447 0.728 0.602 
Test of AR(1) (p value) 0.848 0.774 0.845 0.782 
Number of districts22 507 507 507 507 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas and INDO-DAPOER; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; 
Standard errors in parentheses; The full estimation and test results are presented in Appendix, 
Table A15. 
The results are consistent across specifications, showing that more educated 
districts experience less property crime. On average, a one year increase in 
21 Numbers of instrumental variables reported in diff-GMM include numbers of exogenous 
explanatory variables served as instrumental variables. Hence, the lagged endogenous explanatory 
variables served as instrumental variables are fewer than the reported numbers, e.g 6 in the full 
model (4). 
22 During period 2007-2012, there was district proliferation, so numbers of districts were different 
between years (Table 5.1). Numbers of districts in diff-GMM estimations, e.g. Table 5.2, are the 
total numbers of districts that ever existed in the period. 
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schooling of the population leads to almost a 0.93 percentage point decrease in the 
victim rate. Given the fact that the average years of schooling of Indonesians rise 
by 0.5 years over the six year period, from 2007 to 2012, and the average share of 
Indonesians being a victim of crime in this period is 1.9 per cent, the magnitude of 
the crime reducing impact that education creates in Indonesia is sizable. It can be 
said that the improvement in education levels of Indonesians significantly 
contribute to the reduction in the incidence of property crime in the country.  
As shown in all estimations, the incidence of crime in a year significantly 
depends on the amount of crime occurring in the previous year. The negative 
coefficients of the dummy variables controlling for time effects indicate a decline 
in the property crime victimisation rates during the period. Among variables 
characterizing a district’s development, the Gini index and average per capital 
expenditure are positively associated with the levels of crime, consistent with 
Cameron and Shah (2013). Other variables including poverty rates, GDP growth 
rates, urbanization and the share of males aged 15-25 in the population have no 
significant influence on the crime situation in the district, but districts with large 
population experience more property crimes relative to small districts23. Finally, in 
all four specifications, the Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions 
23 There is evidence about the association between unemployment and crime (Melick 2003; Papps 
and Winkelmann 2000). However, information on unemployment at the district level in 
Indonesia is not accessible. Thus, in Table A16 in Appendix I use the share of inactive population 
in a district to represent unemployment. The results show that the share of inactive population is 
insignificant. 
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and the test of no serial correlation of order one between error terms speak to the 
statistical validity of the instrumental variables.  
5.4.2. Robustness checks24 
This section checks the sensitivity of difference GMM estimators in dynamic panel 
models to the length of lags. Various estimations are conducted to check whether 
the estimated effects of education on crime are robust (Table 5.3). First, the length 
of lag is varied so that the instrumental sets include only lag two (column 1), lag 
two and three (column 2), lag two to four (column 3), and lag two to five (column 
4). Then, control variables related to the economic condition of the districts 
including per capita expenditure, the Gini indexes, poverty rates and GDP growth 
rates are treated as endogenous regressors (column 5), rather than as exogenous. 
Since the number of endogenous explanatory variables considerably rises in this 
specification (column 5), the combination of collapsed lags 2-4 is made use of to 
reduce the number of instrumental variables25. All estimations in this section 
employ the full set of control variables, as per that in column 4, Table 5.2.  
 
24. I replicate all of these estimations for the restricted sample where districts in Jakarta are 
excluded. Jakarta is often excluded in empirical analyses using the district level data, for example 
Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005) and Lewis (2017), because its districts are considered 
outliners. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of Jakarta. 
25. I treat economic-related variables as exogenous regressors in most of the specifications because 
this help to reduce the number of instrumental variables, thus substantially diminishing bias 
Roodman (2009). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Victimisation rate Lag 2 only Lag 2-3 Lag 2-4 Lag 2-5 Collapsed lags 2-4 
Years of schooling, aged 15+ -0.866*** -0.909*** -0.932*** -0.866*** -0.929*** 
 (0.200) (0.198) (0.200) (0.196) (0.253) 
Number of instruments 19 25 29 31 25 
Sargan test (p value) 0.527 0.225 0.380 0.441 0.868 
Hansen test (p value) 0.542 0.221 0.437 0.198 0.714 
Test of AR(1) (p value) 0.817 0.839 0.854 0.786 0.684 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas and INDO-DAPOER; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors in parentheses; The full estimation and test results are 
presented in Appendix, Table A17.
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The results consistently show the significant effects of education on the 
amount of crime in a district. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects is stable across 
specifications, ranging from 0.866 to 0.932, which is similar to that in the 
benchmark models. The Sargan and Hansen tests and the test of serial correlation 
imply the validity of the instrumental variables.  
In short, the point estimates of education are not sensitive to the length of lags 
served as instrument variables in difference GMM, confirming the robust effects of 
education on crime reduction in Indonesia.  
5.4.3. Different indicators of education 
This section adopts the same specification to that in column 4, Table 5.2 (the full 
set of control variables and lags two to two serving as instrumental variables) but 
uses different indicators of education to further explore the crime reducing potential 
of education (see Table 5.2). First, years of schooling of the population aged seven 
and above, rather than those of age group 15 and above, are used to explain the 
variation in the victim rate (column 1). Still, the effect is highly significant, 
indicating that if all Indonesians extend the time they stay in school by one year, 
the property crime victimisation rate will decrease by 1.1 percentage point. 
Next, the share of the population aged 15 and above without educational 
qualifications is employed to verify whether this variable is positively associated 
with the volume of crime, as found by Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2011) for England 
and Wales. The estimation results show that an increase of one percentage point in 
the share of district population without qualifications indeed leads to additional 0.13 
percentage points of the property crime victimisation rates (column 2).  
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Table 5.4. Different measurements of education 
Victimisation rate (1) (2) (3) 
Years of schooling, aged 7+ -1.074***   
 (0.417)   
No qualifications, aged 15+ (%)  0.122***  
  (0.040)  
Primary education, aged 15+ (%)   0.066 
   (0.082) 
Junior Secondary education, aged 
15+ (%)   -0.134* 
   (0.071) 
Senior Secondary education and 
above, aged 15+ (%) 
  -0.172*** 
  (0.062) 
Number of instruments 17 17 23 
Sargan test (p value) 0.522 0.378 0.617 
Hansen test (p value) 0.531 0.128 0.367 
Test of AR(1) (p value) 0.612 0.856 0.918 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas and INDO-DAPOER; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; 
Standard errors in parentheses; The full estimation and test results are presented in 
Appendix, Table A18. 
Finally, no educational qualifications is served as the reference category for 
comparison with other levels of education (column 3). The results suggest that the 
impacts of education on crime rise with levels of education. Specifically, the change 
in the share of the population aged 15 and above attaining primary education has 
no effect on the incidence of property crime occurring in the district. However, a 
one percentage point increase in the population obtaining junior and senior 
secondary education leads to a decrease of 0.13 and almost 0.17 percentage point 
in the victim rates, respectively. It appears that completing 6 years of primary 
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education does not generate a significant non-pecuniary benefit relating crime 
reduction for Indonesia, but junior secondary and higher education does.  
In summary, the causal effect of education on crime is found robust across 
different indicators of education and senior secondary education appears to play a 
particular important role in mitigating property crime in Indonesia. 
5.4.4. School age children 
As mentioned earlier, the shares of children under 18 year old among the victims 
of property crime in Indonesia declined remarkably by half during the period 2007-
2012 while the enrolment rates among school age children gradually rose from 84.2 
per cent to 87.8 per cent (Table 5.1). Thus, this section examines whether enrolling 
in a school can help children to avoid being victimised and whether children’s 
enrolment can also lessen the amount of crime experienced by people in the district. 
Table 5.5. School age children 
Victimisation rate  
(1) (2) 
All population Aged 7-18 
Enrolment rate, aged 7-18 -0.088** 0.012 
 (0.044) (0.041) 
Number of instruments 17 17 
Sargan test (p value) 0.338 0.513 
Hansen test (p value) 0.108 0.220 
Test of AR(1) (p value) 0.187 0.257 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas and INDO-DAPOER; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; 
Standard errors in parentheses; The full estimation and test results are presented in 
Appendix, Table A19. 
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Table 5.5 presents the estimation results when the school enrolment rates 
among the school age population are used to represent the level of education in the 
district. In column 1, the crime variable is the property crime victimisation rate of 
the whole population in the district. The result shows that districts with high school 
enrolment rates experience less property crime than those with low enrolment rates. 
An additional one percentage point of the population aged 7-18 staying in school 
causes a 0.09 percentage point decrease in the victim rate. A possible explanation 
is that students are supervised in school, so they are less likely to be victims of 
crime, as a result, decreasing the victim rate in the district as a whole. An alternative 
explanation concerns the incapacitation impact of schooling on crime. Students are 
unable to present in classes and participate in illegal activities at the same time. The 
estimation result in column 2 suggests that the latter interpretation is likely to be 
reasonable in this case. In column 2 where the levels of crime are measured by the 
property crime victimisation rate of the school age population, the coefficient of 
enrolment is insignificant. Hence, enrolling in school does not help to protect the 
school age cohort from being a victim of property crime, implying that the former 
interpretation does not fit. 
In short, the results suggest children’s school enrolment, despite not 
significantly lessening the likelihood of being victimised for children themselves, 
yields an incapacitation impact, through which it prevents children from 
participating in illegal activities, and thus alleviates the incidence of crime. 
5.4.5. Gender difference 
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Table 5.6. Gender difference 
Victimisation rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All 
population 
Females All 
population 
Males 
Years of schooling, 
female aged 15+ 
-0.834*** -0.499*   
(0.314) (0.299)   
Years of schooling, male 
aged 15+ 
  -1.011** -1.383** 
  (0.413) (0.547) 
Number of instruments 17 17 17 17 
Sargan test (p value) 0.667 0.401 0.604 0.749 
Hansen test (p value) 0.725 0.435 0.508 0.821 
Test of AR(1) (p value) 0.885 0.525 0.612 0.879 
Observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas and INDO-DAPOER; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; 
Standard errors in parentheses; The full estimation and test results are presented in 
Appendix, Table A20. 
This section explores how the impacts of education on crime vary by gender. First, 
the victim rates and education variables are reconstructed separately for females 
and males in the district. Next, estimations are conducted to gauge how the 
education levels of females and males affect their own experience of property crime 
as well as the amount of crime experienced by people in the district as a whole. 
Recall that Indonesian females, on average, are less likely to be victimised and have 
lower education than males (Table 5.1). Estimation results by gender are displayed 
in Table 5.6. Although the education levels of both genders significantly decrease 
the incidence of crime occurring in the district, the effect exerted by the education 
of males (column 3) is considerably stronger than that of females (column 1). 
Similarly, the crime reducing impact of education in the equation for man (column 
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4) approximately doubles that for women (column 2).  This result is in line with the 
findings concerning the gender difference in arrested rates by Amin et al. (2016) 
and Anderson (2014) for the United States. 
5.4.6. Poverty and the impact of education on property crime 
As examining the impact of education on crime, particularly property crime, in a 
developing country like Indonesia, where over 10 per cent of the population is poor, 
it is relevant to consider this impact in the connection with poverty. Although no 
evidence to suggest a significant effect of poverty on crime has been found in the 
benchmark estimations (Table 5.2), this section gauges whether the effect of 
education on crime varies relative to the extent of poverty situation in a district. The 
interactions between the average years of schooling and the share of the population 
in the district living under a particular cut off expenditure are included in the 
estimation, as shown in equation (5.3) below. 
tiittitititititi uTXPEEVV ,,,,3,21,10, +++++++= − εγαββββ   (5.3)  
Where tiP , is the share of the population in the district living under a particular 
level of expenditure, for instance the 10th percentile of the country’s distribution. In 
equation (5.3), the total marginal effect of education on crime is tiP ,32 ββ + . Hence, 
the coefficient of the interaction term, 3β , refers to variations in the effect of 
education on crime relative to the poverty situation in the district.  
Table 5.7 summarises the main estimation results of equation (5.3) with 
different levels of expenditure, ranging from the 5th (column 1) to 20th percentile 
(column 5). In column 3 is the interaction between education and poverty rates, 
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which varied between 10 per cent and 15 per cent in 2007-2012. The positive 
coefficients of the interaction terms between education and the share of the 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent poorest population living in the district, although only 
significant at the level of 0.1, implying that poverty weakens the extent to which 
education affects crime. However, the interactions with the higher cut off levels of 
expenditure, such as the poverty line, the 15th or 20th percentile, are statistically 
insignificant. Hence, the results suggest that poverty only weakens the extent to 
which education alleviate crime in districts with extremely poor households, those 
living below the 10th percentile of Indonesian expenditure distribution. 
Anderson (2014) is among few who have investigated the variation in the 
effect of education on crime across income levels. However, the author did not find 
any statistically significant variation. The possible reason is that Anderson (2014) 
analysed the relationship between education and crime in the context of a developed 
country like the United States, where the social security system mostly ensures the 
basic necessities of poor people, thus could not find a difference in the effect of 
education on crime across income levels. 
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 Table 5.7. Interaction with poverty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Victimisation rate 5th percentile 10th percentile Poverty line 15th percentile 20th percentile 
Years of schooling, aged 15+ -1.247*** -1.114*** -0.988*** -1.027*** -1.183*** 
 (0.452) (0.384) (0.369) (0.357) (0.425) 
Interaction 0.015* 0.007* 0.002 0.004 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Poverty rate 0.002 0.002 -0.019 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of instruments 20 20 20 20 20 
Sargan test (p value) 0.978 0.989 0.870 0.991 0.911 
Hansen test (p value) 0.932 0.944 0.744 0.904 0.634 
Test of AR(1) (p value) 0.615 0.921 0.799 0.783 0.824 
Observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas and INDO-DAPOER; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors in parentheses; The full estimation and test results are 
presented in Appendix, Table A21.  
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5.5. Summary of main findings and policy implications  
The shares of Indonesians being a victim of crime have considerably declined in 
recent years, from 3.8 per cent in 2007 to 1.2 per cent in 2012 while the education 
levels of people in the country have consistently increased over time. This paper 
established the causal relationship between education and property crime in 
Indonesia over the period 2007-2012. The victimization rate at the district level was 
used to represent the incidence of crime. The difference GMM estimation technique 
was employed to address the endogeneity of education and the dynamics of crime. 
The results show that districts with a higher average level of education experience 
less property crime, and this causal relationship is robust across different model 
specifications and education indicators. In conclusion, the improvement in the 
education level of Indonesians significantly contributes to the reduction in the 
incidence of crime in the country. 
A further investigation demonstrates that the crime reducing effect generated 
by males’ education is stronger than that generated by females’ education. 
Estimations of crime victimization rates on different indicators of education show 
that the degree to which education diminishes crime rises with levels of education. 
While primary education appears to have no influence on the levels of crime, higher 
education, especially senior secondary education and above, leads to significantly 
less crime. In addition, there is suggestive evidence that schooling yields an 
incapacitation impact, through which it prevents children from participating in 
illegal activities. Finally, extreme poverty can mitigate the effect of education on 
crime.  
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The findings relating to the crime reducing impact of education, especially in 
terms of senior secondary education, in this paper provide an additional supporting 
reason for the implementation of compulsory senior secondary education in 
Indonesia, which commenced recently. A key recommendation of this paper would 
be that the non-pecuniary benefits of schooling such as crime reduction, should be 
taken into account in the policy making process, for example, policies related to 
compulsory senior secondary education. Additionally, the government should 
consider educational improvement and poverty mitigation as possible solutions, 
apart from law enforcement, to crime. 
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6. Conclusions   
Human capital yields both economic and non-economic benefits, and thus plays an 
important role in the development of a society. It is even a critical factor for 
developing countries in their journey to catch up with the developed world. With 
the objective of obtaining better a understanding of human capital in general, and 
that in developing countries in particular, this thesis has investigated three different 
issues related to human capital by using data from Indonesia and Vietnam.  
The first theme concerns a determinant of human capital: time allocation. 
Because human capital is accumulated gradually through learning and working 
process, the way children spend their time on studying, working and leisure directly 
affects their physical and mental health, their skills and knowledge, thus determines 
their human capital. In this regard, Chapter 3 examined how the child’s time is 
allocated between activities. It focused particularly on the role of parental academic 
aspirations in determining the child’s time allocation.  
The second and third themes are related to a narrow definition of human 
capital: education. In particular, Chapter 4 spotlighted inequality in education in 
Vietnam. This Chapter sought explanations for the ethnic heterogeneity of 
education outcomes in the country, where the non-Kinh minority children lag far 
behind in all education indicators compared the Kinh majority peers. Chapter 5 
examined a non-economic benefit of education: crime reducing effect. For this 
theme, Indonesia is an interesting case because this country has experienced a 
consistent decrease in crime victimization rates, despite an extremely high level of 
corruption in the police force and justice system. Hence, it is reasonable to question 
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if an improvement in the education level of Indonesians is a driving factor behind 
the decrease in the incidence of crime. The main results and findings of each 
research paper are summarized below. 
6.1. Summary 
Chapter 3 examined the link between parental academic aspirations for a child and 
the allocation of a child’s time. First, a general answer was derived from the 
economic model of household utility maximization. In the model, parental 
aspirations are a factor that augments the efficiency of a child’s studying time, 
which, in turn, helps to increase the human capital that a child accumulates, and 
thus raise household utility. The statistical analysis shows that parental aspirations 
are positively associated with the optimal studying time of the child and negatively 
associated with the optimal working time. To verify the findings from the 
theoretical model, data from the 2006 and 2014 Vietnam Young Lives Survey were 
used to estimate a system of equations of a child’s time allocation, in which parental 
aspirations are the key explanatory variable of interest. The results of the empirical 
analysis support the theoretical findings, confirming a causal relationship between 
parental academic aspirations and the allocation of a child’s time. A further analysis 
suggests that parental academic aspirations have no significant effect on the time 
doing housework for boys, but significantly reduce the workload for girls. 
Academic performance of a child is positively affected by hours of study, and 
negatively influenced by the time he or she works. 
Chapter 4 explained the existence of the disparity in education outcomes 
between non-Kinh ethnic minority children and the Kinh ethnic majority 
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counterpart in Vietnam. The ethic gaps in favour of the Kinh group were found for 
various education indicators including enrolment, schooling progress and academic 
performance. The investigation used data from the 2009 YLS and 2011-2012 
YLSS, and employed Probit and multilevel regression models, and associated 
decomposition techniques. The results suggest that the key determinants of 
education outcomes as well as the main factors contributing to the ethnic gaps vary, 
depending on the education indicators and ethnic groups being examined. 
Education of the father, who is likely to be the decision maker in the family, 
significantly affects the enrolment status of the child, while education of the mother, 
who spends more time with the child, is more important to the child’s schooling 
progress. Disadvantages related to the external determinants, such as poverty, low 
level of home support and low school quality, are still obstacles to minority children 
obtaining high test scores. Father’s education and household economic condition 
are dominant contributors to the difference in enrolment rates between Kinh and 
non-Kinh children. However, the gap in schooling progress is explained by all child, 
household and commune attributes. The test score gaps are attributable to a broader 
set of variables including, but not limited to, parent’s education, the use of the 
Vietnamese language, peer and school characteristics. 
Chapter 5 examined the effect of education on property crime in Indonesia 
over the period 2007-2012. The incidence of crime is represented by the 
victimization rate at the district level. The diff-GMM estimation technique was 
employed to address the endogeneity of education and dynamics of crime, and thus 
identifying the causal effect. The results show that more educated districts 
experience less property crime. In particular, a 1 year rise in schooling of people 
living in the district, on average, reduces the victimization rate by 1 percentage 
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point. A further investigation demonstrated that the causal effect is found stronger 
in the models associated with the level education of the male population and crime 
incidents reported by males than those associated with females. Secondary and 
higher education are particularly important to mitigating crime. In addition, there is 
suggestive evidence that schooling yields an incapacitation effect to prevent 
children from participating in illegal activities. Finally, poverty appears to have no 
direct influence on the incidence of crime, but extreme poverty can mitigate the 
extent to which education reduces crime.  
6.2. Contributions and policy implications 
The theoretical and empirical analyses conducted in this thesis have made 
significant contributions to literature about human capital in various aspects. For 
example, one of the themes in this thesis appears to have never been explored 
before, i.e. the relationship between parental academic aspirations and a child’s 
time allocation; the determinants of the ethnic gap in education have been precisely 
identified by investigating different education outcomes; an old research question 
has been approached from a different aspect, i.e. examining the impacts of 
education on crime from victims’ perspectives rather than criminals. The findings 
and policy implications related to education and human capital in this thesis are 
particularly important for Indonesia and Vietnam to develop their economies and 
societies. The detail contributions and policy implications derived from each 
research theme are as follows. 
Chapter 3’s contribution to the literature is certain because it is the first to 
investigate the relationship between parental academic aspirations for a child and 
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the child’s time allocation. It identified that the allocation of a child’s time is a 
missing link in the relationship between parental aspirations and the child’s 
academic achievements. The findings suggest that future studies should consider 
the allocation of a child’s time as a channel through which parental aspirations 
affect a child’s educational attainment. The findings also have a policy implication 
that interventions or programs, such as those related to economic and social returns 
to education, can raise parents’ academic expectations and aspirations for a child, 
and thus positively affect the child outcomes. 
Chapter 4 adds to the literature by investigating the ethnic gaps across 
different education outcomes. The results show that key factors explaining the 
ethnic gaps in education might be different, depending on the education outcome 
under examination. These results, despite being straightforwardly relevant for 
policy implication, have not been explicitly specified in previous studies for 
Vietnam. The findings suggest that efforts to narrow the ethnic gaps in education 
should vary the focus and priority according to the targeted outcomes. For example, 
improving household economic condition might be relevant to narrowing the 
enrolment and schooling progress gaps, but in order to equalize education 
performance across the ethnic groups, removing the language barriers and 
improving school quality are more important. 
Chapter 5 contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of 
education on crime from a different angle: victims’ perspective rather than 
criminals. The findings relating to the crime reducing impact of education in 
Chapter 5 constitute strong evidence of non-pecuniary benefits of education. In this 
regard, the key policy recommendation is that non-pecuniary benefits of schooling 
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such as crime reduction should be taken into account in the decisions related to 
education policy. In the case of Indonesia, the findings are supportive evidence for 
the expansion of basic education through senior secondary school, which has been 
recently launched. Additionally, in the fight against crime, the government should 
consider education improvement and poverty mitigation as efficient tools beside 
law enforcement. 
6.3. Limitations of the thesis and suggestions for further studies 
The author acknowledges numbers of limitations of the thesis and propose 
suggestions for further studies as follows. 
In chapter 3, the theoretical model was simplified by assuming that leisure 
time is constant and not distinguishing between market and home productions. 
These assumptions may not be realistic, but they facilitate the algebraic derivative 
of the association between parental aspirations and a child’s time allocation on 
studying and working, which is the main purpose of the theoretical analysis. In 
addition, there may be a criticism about exogeneity of the instrumental variable 
used in the empirical models, the average local wage. Indeed, the instrumental 
variable might be not exogenous to the extent that it may be correlated with the 
economic development level and labor market in a region, which, at the same time, 
affect a child’s work and study. Although controlling for regional dummy variables 
in the empirical analysis significantly help to reduce bias due to unobservable 
regional fixed effects, this cannot capture all characteristics of an economic region.  
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As mentioned, research in chapter 3 is the first to explore the impact of 
parental academic aspirations on a child’s time allocation. This suggests that further 
comparative work, in other countries, especially in the developing world, would be 
useful. 
In chapter 4, the data used in the main analysis are from the Young Lives 
surveys. Given the Young Lives sample is not nationally representative, the 
findings in this chapter should be interpreted with caution. The limitation of the 
sample suggests that further studies along this line using national representative 
data would be useful. 
In chapter 5, one relevant explanatory variable, unemployment rates, was not 
included in the econometric models because the data were not accessible at the 
district level. Including unemployment rates in the empirical models would possibly 
provide insightful analyses and policy implications. However, the absence of this 
variable by no means undermines the conclusions related to the impacts of 
education on crime, which is the main focus of the chapter. Furthermore, the diff-
GMM estimation technique employed in the econometric models helps to address 
potential bias caused by the omission of unemployment rates. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Definition of variables in Young Lives surveys 
Variables Definition 
Hours of study Daily hours of study 
Hours of economic work Daily hours of economic work 
Hours of housework Daily hours of housework 
Parental aspirations  Years of school that parents wish their child to 
complete 
Younger Cohort Dummy = 1 if a child belongs to younger cohort 
Male Dummy = 1 if a child is male 
Child's age in month Child's age in month 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) BMI-for-age z-score in previous survey 
Birth order Child’s birth order 
Child's highest grade Child's highest grade completed 
Adjusted PPVT IRT-Adjusted PPVT 
Non-Kinh child Dummy = 1 if child is non-Kinh ethnicity 
Number of children aged 0-5 Number of children aged 0-5 
Education of caregiver Years of school of the caregiver 
Main caregiver is a parent Dummy = 1 if the caregiver is a parent 
Wealth index Wealth index 
North East Dummy = 1 if the region is North East 
Red River Delta Dummy = 1 if the region is Red River Delta 
South Central Coast Dummy = 1 if the region is South Central Coast 
Mekong River Delta Dummy = 1 if the region is South Central Coast 
Ln(average local wage) Logarithm of the average local wage 
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Table A2. Mixed process models: hours of study, economic work and chore 
 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
Parental aspirations 0.199*** -0.117** -0.023  
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.018)  
Younger Cohort 0.834*** -0.511*** -0.052 -2.532*** 
 (0.078) (0.183) (0.067) (0.082) 
Male -0.231*** 0.157 -0.519*** -1.210*** 
 (0.066) (0.156) (0.056) (0.066) 
Child's age in month -0.054*** 0.025 0.016* -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) 0.001 -0.043 0.022 0.095*** 
 (0.029) (0.074) (0.025) (0.028) 
Birth order -0.022 0.106 -0.077*** 0.040 
 (0.033) (0.073) (0.028) (0.032) 
Child's highest grade 0.539*** -0.181* 0.047 0.416*** 
 (0.047) (0.098) (0.040) (0.042) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
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 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
Non-Kinh child -0.094 0.974*** -0.030 0.151 
 (0.139) (0.289) (0.117) (0.132) 
Number of children aged 0-5 -0.077 -0.431*** 0.723*** -0.099 
 (0.066) (0.157) (0.056) (0.063) 
Education of caregiver 0.032*** -0.051* -0.030*** 0.063*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.010) (0.011) 
Main caregiver is a parent 0.147 0.850** -0.058 0.132 
 (0.156) (0.424) (0.133) (0.148) 
Wealth index 0.549* -0.624 -0.628** 2.978*** 
 (0.317) (0.749) (0.271) (0.292) 
North East -0.701*** 2.928*** 0.946*** 3.462*** 
 (0.136) (0.347) (0.117) (0.141) 
Red River Delta 0.363*** 1.542*** 1.173*** 3.631*** 
 (0.109) (0.311) (0.096) (0.128) 
South Central Coast -0.598*** 1.815*** 0.974*** 3.035*** 
 (0.117) (0.316) (0.102) (0.124) 
Mekong River Delta -0.579*** 0.931*** 0.726*** 4.495*** 
 (0.119) (0.334) (0.104) (0.140) 
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 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
Ln(average local wage)    5.797*** 
    (0.117) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table A3. Mixed process models: hours of study, economic work and chore for boys 
 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
Parental aspirations 0.173*** -0.166** -0.003  
 (0.032) (0.070) (0.029)  
Younger Cohort 0.846*** -0.577** 0.025 -2.113*** 
 (0.114) (0.268) (0.102) (0.119) 
Child's age in month -0.053*** 0.018 0.013 -0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.012) (0.014) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) -0.020 -0.021 0.033 0.044 
 (0.038) (0.100) (0.035) (0.038) 
Birth order -0.016 0.166 -0.116*** 0.087* 
 (0.047) (0.104) (0.043) (0.047) 
Child's highest grade 0.579*** -0.260** -0.065 0.606*** 
 (0.064) (0.132) (0.057) (0.057) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
Non-Kinh child -0.030 1.021** -0.050 0.413** 
 (0.194) (0.405) (0.171) (0.192) 
Number of children aged 0-5 -0.082 -0.136 0.721*** -0.064 
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 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
 (0.097) (0.228) (0.086) (0.096) 
Education of caregiver 0.036** -0.062 -0.016 0.059*** 
 (0.017) (0.042) (0.015) (0.016) 
Main caregiver is a parent 0.306 1.156* -0.098 0.173 
 (0.229) (0.648) (0.205) (0.226) 
Wealth index 1.088** -1.167 -0.695* 3.169*** 
 (0.444) (1.074) (0.397) (0.427) 
North East -0.521*** 3.085*** 1.107*** 3.146*** 
 (0.192) (0.493) (0.176) (0.210) 
Red River Delta 0.409*** 1.313*** 1.431*** 3.513*** 
 (0.155) (0.451) (0.145) (0.191) 
South Central Coast -0.509*** 2.192*** 1.175*** 3.024*** 
 (0.163) (0.447) (0.152) (0.181) 
Mekong River Delta -0.377** 0.538 0.897*** 5.368*** 
 (0.169) (0.492) (0.158) (0.231) 
Ln(average local wage)    5.754*** 
    (0.180) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table A4. Mixed process models: hours of study, economic work and chore for girls 
 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
Parental aspirations 0.240*** -0.141*** -0.044**  
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.021)  
Younger Cohort 0.835*** -0.492** -0.125 -3.357*** 
 (0.108) (0.242) (0.088) (0.103) 
Child's age in month -0.052*** 0.026 0.017 -0.013 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) 0.019 -0.058 0.010 0.135*** 
 (0.045) (0.109) (0.037) (0.036) 
Birth order -0.026 0.020 -0.033 -0.013 
 (0.047) (0.100) (0.038) (0.038) 
Child's highest grade 0.470*** -0.010 0.197*** 0.065 
 (0.070) (0.146) (0.057) (0.056) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-Kinh child -0.166 0.802** 0.013 0.034 
 (0.200) (0.403) (0.161) (0.161) 
Number of children aged 0-5 -0.066 -0.766*** 0.726*** -0.162** 
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 Hours of study Hours of economic work Hours of chore Parental aspirations 
 (0.090) (0.213) (0.072) (0.072) 
Education of caregiver 0.027* -0.037 -0.040*** 0.062*** 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.013) (0.012) 
Main caregiver is a parent -0.006 0.791 -0.022 0.034 
 (0.214) (0.550) (0.173) (0.172) 
Wealth index -0.146 0.093 -0.664* 2.654*** 
 (0.456) (1.017) (0.370) (0.356) 
North East -0.938*** 2.828*** 0.805*** 4.296*** 
 (0.192) (0.476) (0.156) (0.169) 
Red River Delta 0.301* 1.754*** 0.931*** 4.484*** 
 (0.154) (0.421) (0.127) (0.157) 
South Central Coast -0.686*** 1.401*** 0.767*** 3.654*** 
 (0.169) (0.438) (0.139) (0.155) 
Mekong River Delta -0.787*** 1.225*** 0.565*** 4.351*** 
 (0.168) (0.445) (0.139) (0.159) 
Ln(average local wage)    7.024*** 
    (0.150) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses
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 Table A5. GMM estimation: hours of study, economic work and chore, all 
children 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic work 
Hours of 
chore 
Parental aspirations 0.199*** -0.080*** -0.030* 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.016) 
Younger Cohort 0.834*** -0.210*** -0.037 
 (0.081) (0.049) (0.051) 
Male -0.231*** 0.072* -0.380*** 
 (0.066) (0.040) (0.044) 
Child's age in month -0.054*** 0.016** 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) 0.001 0.018 0.017 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.019) 
Birth order -0.022 0.034 -0.058** 
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.023) 
Child's highest grade 0.539*** -0.148** 0.041 
 (0.071) (0.062) (0.043) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-Kinh child -0.094 0.470*** 0.009 
 (0.147) (0.116) (0.107) 
Number of children aged 0-5 -0.077 -0.096** 0.634*** 
 (0.067) (0.049) (0.054) 
Education of caregiver 0.032*** -0.003 -0.022*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
Main caregiver is a parent 0.147 0.108 -0.079 
 (0.163) (0.080) (0.116) 
Wealth index 0.549 0.078 -0.368* 
 (0.345) (0.210) (0.211) 
North East -0.701*** 0.619*** 0.580*** 
 (0.128) (0.085) (0.086) 
Red River Delta 0.363*** 0.226*** 0.721*** 
 (0.108) (0.046) (0.065) 
South Central Coast -0.598*** 0.276*** 0.646*** 
 (0.118) (0.059) (0.081) 
Mekong River Delta -0.579*** 0.087 0.461*** 
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  Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic work 
Hours of 
chore 
 (0.119) (0.054) (0.079) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses 
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 Table A6. GMM estimation: hours of study, economic work and chore for 
boys 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic work 
Hours of 
chore 
Parental aspirations 0.173*** -0.107*** -0.013 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.021) 
Younger Cohort 0.846*** -0.204*** -0.004 
 (0.113) (0.072) (0.073) 
Child's age in month -0.053*** 0.015 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-
1) -0.020 0.016 0.024 
 (0.039) (0.022) (0.025) 
Birth order -0.016 0.073* -0.081** 
 (0.051) (0.038) (0.033) 
Child's highest grade 0.579*** -0.170* -0.052 
 (0.099) (0.088) (0.057) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.002 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-Kinh child -0.030 0.526*** -0.041 
 (0.196) (0.174) (0.140) 
Number of children 
aged 0-5 -0.082 -0.043 0.612*** 
 (0.097) (0.083) (0.080) 
Education of caregiver 0.036** -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) 
Main caregiver is a 
parent 0.306 0.134 -0.135 
 (0.257) (0.129) (0.184) 
Wealth index 1.088** 0.047 -0.348 
 (0.480) (0.321) (0.282) 
North East -0.521*** 0.698*** 0.628*** 
 (0.172) (0.133) (0.117) 
Red River Delta 0.409*** 0.186*** 0.796*** 
 (0.152) (0.066) (0.089) 
South Central Coast -0.509*** 0.347*** 0.720*** 
 (0.161) (0.089) (0.112) 
Mekong River Delta -0.377** 0.005 0.505*** 
 (0.165) (0.082) (0.106) 
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 Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses 
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 Table A7. GMM estimation: hours of study, economic work and chore for 
girls 
 Hours of 
study 
Hours of 
economic work 
Hours of 
chore 
Parental aspirations 0.240*** -0.074*** -0.051** 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.021) 
Younger Cohort 0.835*** -0.229*** -0.075 
 (0.114) (0.063) (0.071) 
Child's age in month -0.052*** 0.016* 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-
1) 0.019 0.028 0.006 
 (0.044) (0.021) (0.032) 
Birth order -0.026 -0.014 -0.026 
 (0.052) (0.030) (0.031) 
Child's highest grade 0.470*** -0.102 0.174*** 
 (0.096) (0.075) (0.059) 
Adjusted PPVT 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-Kinh child -0.166 0.366** 0.076 
 (0.218) (0.148) (0.160) 
Number of children 
aged 0-5 -0.066 -0.158*** 0.651*** 
 (0.092) (0.049) (0.073) 
Education of caregiver 0.027* 0.003 -0.030*** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) 
Main caregiver is a 
parent -0.006 0.138* -0.026 
 (0.204) (0.082) (0.145) 
Wealth index -0.146 0.173 -0.445 
 (0.495) (0.254) (0.318) 
North East -0.938*** 0.559*** 0.533*** 
 (0.186) (0.105) (0.125) 
Red River Delta 0.301* 0.276*** 0.631*** 
 (0.154) (0.064) (0.092) 
South Central Coast -0.686*** 0.207*** 0.541*** 
 (0.174) (0.076) (0.117) 
Mekong River Delta -0.787*** 0.140** 0.402*** 
 (0.172) (0.069) (0.116) 
156 
 
 Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses 
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 Table A8. Mixed process models: Maths score, hours of study, economic work, and parental aspirations 
 Maths score Hours of study Hours of economic work Parental aspirations 
Hours of study 0.859***    
 (0.120)    
Hours of economic work -0.076    
 (0.058)    
Parental aspirations  0.204*** -0.127***  
  (0.021) (0.045)  
Male 0.118 -0.218***  -1.217*** 
 (0.079) (0.064)  (0.066) 
Younger Cohort -3.641*** 0.846*** -0.550*** -2.533*** 
 (0.122) (0.078) (0.182) (0.082) 
Child's age in month 0.042*** -0.054*** 0.029 -0.032*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) 
BMI-for-age z-score (-1) 0.068** 0.001 -0.037 0.096*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.074) (0.028) 
Birth order -0.026 -0.026 0.113 0.037 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.073) (0.031) 
Child's highest grade -0.093 0.536*** -0.192** 0.418*** 
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  Maths score Hours of study Hours of economic work Parental aspirations 
 (0.102) (0.047) (0.098) (0.041) 
Non-Kinh child -0.384** -0.112 1.036*** 0.143 
 (0.159) (0.137) (0.285) (0.131) 
Number of children aged 0-5 -0.010 -0.073 -0.424*** -0.098 
 (0.076) (0.066) (0.157) (0.063) 
Education of caregiver 0.045*** 0.033*** -0.056** 0.064*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.010) 
Main caregiver is a parent -0.136 0.146 0.872** 0.131 
 (0.180) (0.156) (0.426) (0.148) 
Wealth index 0.195 0.582* -0.845 3.006*** 
 (0.384) (0.315) (0.744) (0.288) 
North East 0.618*** -0.721*** 2.953*** 3.463*** 
 (0.170) (0.135) (0.347) (0.140) 
Red River Delta 0.145 0.361*** 1.557*** 3.639*** 
 (0.132) (0.109) (0.312) (0.127) 
South Central Coast 0.491*** -0.612*** 1.867*** 3.033*** 
 (0.147) (0.115) (0.314) (0.123) 
Mekong River Delta 0.435*** -0.588*** 0.957*** 4.500*** 
159 
 
  Maths score Hours of study Hours of economic work Parental aspirations 
 (0.148) (0.118) (0.334) (0.140) 
Ln(average local wage)    5.815*** 
    (0.115) 
Notes: Data source: 2006 and 2014 YLS; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A9. Probit models (marginal effects) for enrolment and schooling for age with the common sets of explanatory variables 
 Enrolment Schooling for age 
 All Kinh nonKinh All Kinh nonKinh 
Minority ethnic child -0.005   -0.086***   
 (0.012)   (0.028)   
Age in month -0.003** -0.003** -0.004 0.002 0.004* -0.009** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Younger cohort -0.015 -0.043 0.008 0.378** 0.493*** -0.477* 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.385) (0.187) (0.186) (0.281) 
Boy -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.002 -0.032*** -0.027** -0.043 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.042) 
Health problem -0.015 0.025 -0.116* -0.032 -0.011 -0.136 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.067) (0.029) (0.025) (0.099) 
Mother's year of schooling 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.004** 0.029* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) 
Father's years of schooling 0.004*** 0.003** 0.020*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
Older siblings -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.023 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) 
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  Enrolment Schooling for age 
 All Kinh nonKinh All Kinh nonKinh 
Asset index 0.243*** 0.240*** 0.348*** 0.339*** 0.294*** 0.626*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.051) (0.035) (0.042) (0.100) 
School travel time -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Pseudo R2 0.412 0.438 0.298 0.208 0.155 0.179 
N 2,921 2,516 405 2,921 2,516 405 
 Notes: Data source: 2009 YLS; Significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table A10. Multilevel Models for Maths and Vietnamese scores with the common sets of explanatory variables 
  Maths   Vietnamese  
 All Kinh nonKinh All Kinh nonKinh 
Minority ethnicity child -2.287***   -2.608***   
 (0.498)   (0.434)   
Age in month 0.024* 0.017 0.064*** 0.024 0.035* 0.010 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) 
Boy -0.357** -0.392** 0.024 -1.276*** -1.347*** -0.733** 
 (0.154) (0.178) (0.289) (0.162) (0.177) (0.340) 
Health problem -0.878*** -1.070*** 0.266 -0.612*** -0.673*** -0.321 
 (0.186) (0.192) (0.506) (0.189) (0.192) (0.597) 
Mother's years of school 0.069** 0.066* 0.042 0.068*** 0.055** 0.057 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.075) (0.025) (0.024) (0.074) 
Unknown mother’s 
education 0.493 0.323 1.303* 0.435 0.128 1.316 
 (0.343) (0.391) (0.677) (0.356) (0.326) (1.100) 
Father's years of school 0.054** 0.062** 0.036 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.131* 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.061) (0.025) (0.027) (0.070) 
Unknown farther’s education 0.599** 0.809*** -0.179 1.190*** 1.449*** -0.066 
 (0.258) (0.291) (0.657) (0.314) (0.318) (0.708) 
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   Maths   Vietnamese  
 All Kinh nonKinh All Kinh nonKinh 
Older siblings -0.133** -0.185*** 0.039 -0.242*** -0.247*** -0.254** 
 (0.063) (0.070) (0.117) (0.072) (0.082) (0.107) 
Asset index 0.701 -0.391 4.418 1.230 0.535 5.470* 
 (1.993) (1.980) (5.830) (1.616) (1.676) (2.933) 
School travel time -0.015 -0.028* 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) 
Constant 14.231*** 16.412*** 3.500 15.925*** 15.541*** 11.699*** 
 (2.467) (2.728) (4.753) (2.270) (2.606) (3.579) 
Ln(δv) 0.947*** 0.675*** 1.586*** 0.673*** 0.489*** 1.212*** 
 (0.156) (0.152) (0.122) (0.146) (0.142) (0.106) 
Ln(δu) 0.904*** 0.844*** 0.754** 0.499*** 0.484*** -10.408 
 (0.127) (0.120) (0.319) (0.106) (0.100) (52.502) 
Ln(δε) 1.398*** 1.408*** 1.241*** 1.372*** 1.374*** 1.297*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.070) (0.020) (0.021) (0.053) 
N 3,218 2,831 387 3,218 2,831 387 
Data source: 2011-12 YLSS; Significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses
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 Table A11. Multilevel mixed effect Probit models (marginal effects) for 
enrolment and schooling for age 
 Enrolment Schooling for age 
Minority Ethnic child 0.003 -0.067* 
 (0.013) (0.037) 
Age in month -0.002* 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Younger cohort 0.026 0.371** 
 (0.096) (0.173) 
Boy -0.018*** -0.032** 
 (0.006) (0.012) 
Height-for-age z score 0.003 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
Health problem -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.019) (0.029) 
Mother's year of schooling 0.005*** 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Father's years of schooling 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Older siblings -0.012*** -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Male head -0.008 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.021) 
Asset index 0.224*** 0.305*** 
 (0.031) (0.036) 
Health shock -0.029*** -0.027** 
 (0.008) (0.013) 
Newborn baby shock -0.043** -0.043* 
 (0.017) (0.024) 
School travel time -0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Paved road in commune 0.008 0.063*** 
 (0.012) (0.021) 
Factory in commune 0.016 -0.021 
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  Enrolment Schooling for age 
 (0.012) (0.019) 
Ln(population in commune) -0.001 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.019) 
N          2,921        2,921 
Data source: 2009 YLS; Significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; 
Standard errors in parentheses  
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 Table A12. Probit models (marginal effects) and decomposition results for enrolment and schooling for age (without mother’s education) 
 Enrolment SAGE 
 Kinh nonKinh Explained Kinh nonKinh Explained 
Age in month -0.002* -0.003 0.006 0.004** -0.006 0.016 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014) 
Younger cohort -0.001 0.112 0.002 0.502*** -0.223 -0.005 
 (0.102) (0.292) (0.006) (0.149) (0.406) (0.009) 
Boy -0.022*** 0.001 0.000 -0.028** -0.024 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.000) (0.012) (0.042) (0.001) 
Height-for-age z score 0.004 0.006 -0.005 0.014** 0.118*** -0.099*** 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.015) (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) 
Health problem 0.030 -0.078 -0.002 -0.008 -0.111* -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.055) (0.001) (0.024) (0.066) (0.002) 
Father's years of schooling 0.004*** 0.022*** -0.077*** 0.007*** 0.007 -0.028 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.022) (0.001) (0.009) (0.029) 
Older siblings -0.013*** -0.013 -0.006 -0.013** -0.022 -0.011 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) 
Male head -0.010 -0.027 -0.001 -0.022 -0.053 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.054) (0.004) (0.019) (0.094) (0.005) 
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  Enrolment SAGE 
 Kinh nonKinh Explained Kinh nonKinh Explained 
Asset index 0.240*** 0.301*** -0.054*** 0.291*** 0.388*** -0.079*** 
 (0.028) (0.115) (0.021) (0.043) (0.133) (0.026) 
Health shock -0.026*** -0.038 0.000 -0.034*** 0.015 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.037) (0.000) (0.013) (0.051) (0.000) 
Newborn baby shock -0.027 -0.096** -0.004* -0.059** -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.021) (0.047) (0.002) (0.024) (0.071) (0.003) 
School travel time -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Paved road in commune 0.025 0.037 -0.007 0.063*** 0.029 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.049) (0.010) (0.023) (0.064) (0.013) 
Factory in commune 0.005 0.055 -0.012 -0.028** 0.124** -0.029** 
 (0.009) (0.049) (0.011) (0.014) (0.063) (0.015) 
Ln(population in commune) 0.013 -0.043 0.025 0.033** 0.087* -0.056* 
 (0.009) (0.043) (0.025) (0.013) (0.048) (0.031) 
Total   -0.137***   -0.282*** 
   (0.023)   (0.028) 
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  Enrolment SAGE 
 Kinh nonKinh Explained Kinh nonKinh Explained 
Pseudo R2 0.439 0.326  0.168 0.231  
N 2,516 405  2,516 405  
Notes: Data source: 2009 YLS; Significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table A13. Probit models (marginal effects) and decomposition results for enrolment and schooling for age (without father’s education) 
 Enrolment SAGE 
 Kinh nonKinh Explained Kinh nonKinh Explained 
Age in month -0.002** -0.002 0.004 0.004** -0.007 0.016 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) 
Younger cohort -0.007 0.201 0.004 0.511*** -0.266 -0.005 
 (0.099) (0.299) (0.007) (0.150) (0.403) (0.008) 
Boy -0.022*** 0.006 0.000 -0.027** -0.024 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.001) (0.012) (0.042) (0.001) 
Height-for-age z score 0.006 0.008 -0.007 0.015** 0.117*** -0.092*** 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.016) (0.007) (0.024) (0.019) 
Health problem 0.026 -0.072 -0.002 -0.007 -0.115* -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.054) (0.002) (0.024) (0.066) (0.002) 
Mother's year of schooling 0.005*** 0.008 -0.036 0.006*** 0.022** -0.089** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.039) (0.002) (0.010) (0.039) 
Older siblings -0.011*** -0.013 -0.006 -0.011* -0.018 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) 
Male head 0.004 -0.020 -0.001 -0.006 -0.030 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.057) (0.004) (0.018) (0.098) (0.005) 
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  Enrolment SAGE 
 Kinh nonKinh Explained Kinh nonKinh Explained 
Asset index 0.248*** 0.356*** -0.071*** 0.317*** 0.344*** -0.065*** 
 (0.026) (0.117) (0.024) (0.042) (0.133) (0.025) 
Health shock -0.025*** -0.039 0.000 -0.035*** 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.038) (0.000) (0.013) (0.052) (0.000) 
Newborn baby shock -0.025 -0.111** -0.005** -0.060** -0.014 -0.001 
 (0.021) (0.047) (0.002) (0.024) (0.070) (0.003) 
School travel time -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Paved road in commune 0.021 0.031 -0.006 0.062*** 0.020 -0.004 
 (0.016) (0.049) (0.011) (0.024) (0.064) (0.012) 
Factory in commune 0.005 0.050 -0.012 -0.030** 0.115* -0.025* 
 (0.009) (0.048) (0.012) (0.014) (0.064) (0.014) 
Ln(population in commune) 0.015* -0.035 0.022 0.035*** 0.082* -0.049* 
 (0.009) (0.043) (0.028) (0.013) (0.050) (0.029) 
Total   -0.119***   -0.308*** 
   (0.031)   (0.027) 
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  Enrolment SAGE 
 Kinh nonKinh Explained Kinh nonKinh Explained 
Pseudo R2 0.445 0.308  0.164 0.237  
N 2,516 405  2,516 405  
Data source: 2009 YLS; Significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses
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 Table A14. Mean of some explanatory variables by parents’ education 
 
Father’s education 
is known 
Father’s education is 
unknown Difference 
Minor Ethnicity 0.132 0.079 0.053*** 
Age in month 124.985 125.669 -0.685*** 
Boy 0.531 0.503 0.028 
Health problem 0.224 0.218 0.006 
Repeated grades 0.038 0.050 -0.012 
Vietnamese at home 0.901 0.951 -0.050*** 
Older siblings 0.973 0.886 0.087* 
Asset index 0.715 0.714 0.002 
School travel time 0.130 0.119 0.012 
 
Mother’s education 
is known 
Mother’s education 
is unknown Difference 
    
Minor Ethnicity 0.130 0.080 0.050*** 
Age in month 124.912 126.135 -1.222*** 
Boy 0.523 0.532 -0.009 
Health problem 0.222 0.223 -0.000 
Repeated grades 0.039 0.051 -0.013 
Vietnamese at home 0.901 0.960 -0.059*** 
Older siblings 0.970 0.880 0.089* 
Asset index 0.715 0.716 -0.002 
School travel time 0.129 0.121 0.008 
Data source: 2011-12 YLSS; Significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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 Table A15. Benchmark estimations 
Victimisation rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged victim rate 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Years of school, aged 15+ -0.854** -0.853*** -0.929** -0.932*** 
 (0.335) (0.330) (0.365) (0.352) 
Year = 2009 -1.326*** -1.344*** -1.310*** -1.329*** 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.115) 
Year = 2010 -0.932*** -0.979*** -0.989*** -1.045*** 
 (0.226) (0.216) (0.224) (0.210) 
Year = 2011 -1.177*** -1.245*** -1.461*** -1.549*** 
 (0.167) (0.158) (0.155) (0.151) 
Year = 2012 -1.244*** -1.330*** -1.606*** -1.714*** 
 (0.216) (0.203) (0.195) (0.184) 
Ln(Population)  0.944***  1.127*** 
  (0.360)  (0.371) 
Urban population (%)  0.005  0.004 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%)  -0.009  -0.010 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
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 Victimisation rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(per capita expenditure)   0.770** 0.788** 
   (0.366) (0.368) 
Gini   1.791** 1.854** 
   (0.873) (0.869) 
Poverty (%)   0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth (%)   0.002 0.002 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of IVs 10 13 14 17 
Sargan Chi_sq 2.442 2.969 2.072 2.710 
Sargan P_value 0.655 0.563 0.723 0.607 
Hasen Chi_sq 3.097 3.709 2.040 2.744 
Hasen P_value 0.542 0.447 0.728 0.602 
AR(1) z 0.192 0.287 0.195 0.277 
AR(1) P_value 0.848 0.774 0.845 0.782 
CLR 0.031 0.04 0.022 0.029 
CLR P_value 0.987 0.984 0.991 0.988 
AR 2.927 3.467 1.945 1.954 
AR P_value 0.818 0.748 0.925 0.924 
Number of group 507 507 507 507 
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 Victimisation rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of observation 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A16. Benchmark estimations, controlling for the share of non-active 
population 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged victim rate 0.111*** 0.115*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
Year of school, aged 15+ -0.898** -0.900*** 
 (0.356) (0.345) 
Year = 2009 -1.323*** -1.342*** 
 (0.118) (0.116) 
Year = 2010 -1.009*** -1.063*** 
 (0.221) (0.207) 
Year = 2011 -1.479*** -1.563*** 
 (0.158) (0.153) 
Year = 2012 -1.630*** -1.735*** 
 (0.196) (0.186) 
Ln(population)  1.106*** 
  (0.366) 
Urban population (%)  0.004 
  (0.005) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%)  -0.010 
  (0.019) 
Ln(per capita expenditure) 0.743** 0.759** 
 (0.362) (0.364) 
Gini 1.848** 1.909** 
 (0.873) (0.870) 
Poverty (%) 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth (%) 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Non-active population, aged 15+ (%)  -2.680 -2.628 
 (3.965) (3.993) 
Number of instruments 15 18 
Sargan Chi_sq 2.123 2.766 
Sargan P_value 0.713 0.598 
Hasen Chi_sq 2.223 2.970 
Hasen P_value 0.695 0.563 
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  (1) (2) 
AR(1) z 0.295 0.375 
AR(1) P_value 0.768 0.707 
CLR 0.026 0.082 
CLR P_value 0.989 0.968 
AR 2.124 2.186 
AR P_value 0.908 0.902 
Number of districts 507 507 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 
 Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard 
errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A17. Robustness check 
Victimisation rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag 2 only Lag 2-3 Lag 2-4 Lag 2-5 Collapsed lags 2-4 
Lagged victim rate 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.093*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) 
Years of school, aged 15+ -0.866*** -0.909*** -0.932*** -0.866*** -0.929*** 
 (0.200) (0.198) (0.200) (0.196) (0.253) 
Year = 2009 -1.322*** -1.300*** -1.293*** -1.300*** -1.410*** 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) (0.135) 
Year = 2010 -1.106*** -1.082*** -1.066*** -1.084*** -1.333*** 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.151) (0.155) (0.311) 
Year = 2011 -1.609*** -1.604*** -1.600*** -1.581*** -1.736*** 
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.139) (0.143) (0.502) 
Year = 2012 -1.776*** -1.783*** -1.777*** -1.774*** -1.945*** 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.164) (0.677) 
Ln(Population)  1.130*** 1.313*** 1.307*** 1.262*** 1.100 
 (0.327) (0.336) (0.329) (0.352) (0.695) 
Urban population (%) 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%) -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 
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 Victimisation rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag 2 only Lag 2-3 Lag 2-4 Lag 2-5 Collapsed lags 2-4 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Ln(per capita expenditure) 0.822*** 0.921*** 0.959*** 0.912*** 2.741 
 (0.298) (0.307) (0.295) (0.296) (2.323) 
Gini 1.731** 1.703* 1.713** 1.442* -8.231 
 (0.835) (0.871) (0.859) (0.875) (5.755) 
Poverty (%) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
GDP growth (%) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.063 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.044) 
Number of IVs 19 25 29 31 25 
Sargan Chi_sq 5.135 15.315 17.091 18.228 6.835 
Sargan P_value 0.527 0.225 0.380 0.441 0.868 
Hasen Chi_sq 5.014 15.384 16.233 22.800 8.868 
Hasen P_value 0.542 0.221 0.437 0.198 0.714 
AR(1) Z_value 0.232 0.203 0.184 0.272 -0.407 
AR(1) P_value 0.817 0.839 0.854 0.786 0.684 
CLR 0.012 0.26 0.265 0.422 3.695 
CLR P_value 0.995 0.901 0.905 0.857 0.995 
AR 4.884 14.668 15.527 22.193 10.274 
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 Victimisation rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag 2 only Lag 2-3 Lag 2-4 Lag 2-5 Collapsed lags 2-4 
AR P_value 0.77 0.401 0.625 0.33 0.923 
Number of group 507 507 507 507 507 
Number of observation 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A18. Different measurements of education 
Victimisation rate (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged victim rate 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.085** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) 
Year of school, aged 7+ -1.074***   
 (0.417)   
No degree, aged 15+ (%)  0.122***  
  (0.040)  
Primary education, aged 15+ 
(%)   0.066 
   (0.082) 
Junior Secondary education, 
aged 15+ (%)   -0.134* 
   (0.071) 
Senior Secondary education 
and above, aged 15+ (%)   -0.172*** 
   (0.062) 
Year = 2009 -1.259*** -1.419*** -1.604*** 
 (0.134) (0.102) (0.151) 
Year = 2010 -1.043*** -1.181*** -1.545*** 
 (0.212) (0.164) (0.237) 
Year = 2011 -1.519*** -1.576*** -1.987*** 
 (0.155) (0.151) (0.224) 
Year = 2012 -1.681*** -1.714*** -2.096*** 
 (0.191) (0.180) (0.257) 
Ln(population) 1.141*** 0.899*** 1.028** 
 (0.376) (0.312) (0.422) 
Urban population (%) 0.004 0.014** 0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%) 0.002 0.007 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) 
Ln(per capita expenditure) 0.785** 0.650** 1.374*** 
 (0.374) (0.318) (0.394) 
Gini 1.765** 1.160 2.517** 
 (0.868) (0.904) (1.233) 
Poverty (%) 0.002 0.001 0.001 
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 Victimisation rate (1) (2) (3) 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP growth (%) 0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Number of instruments 17 17 23 
Sargan test: Chi squared 3.220 4.216 6.269 
Sargan test: P value 0.522 0.378 0.617 
Hansen test: Chi squared 3.166 7.147 8.712 
Hasen test: P value                                  0.531 0.128 0.367 
Test of AR(1): Z 0.507 -0.181 -0.103 
Test of AR(1): P value 0.612 0.856 0.918 
Test of weak IV: CLR 0.057 0.861 1.215 
Test of weak IV: CLR P value 0.976 0.693 0.906 
Test of weak IV: AR 2.965 6.457 7.931 
Test of weak IV: AR P value 0.813 0.374 0.79 
Number of districts 507 507 507 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard 
errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A19. School age children 
Victimisation rate All population Aged 7-18 
Lagged victim rate 0.121*** 0.082*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) 
Enrolment rate, age7-18 -0.088** 0.012 
 (0.044) (0.041) 
Year = 2009 -1.439*** -1.574*** 
 (0.098) (0.095) 
Year = 2010 -1.411*** -1.638*** 
 (0.117) (0.118) 
Year = 2011 -1.552*** -1.641*** 
 (0.149) (0.153) 
Year = 2012 -1.757*** -1.835*** 
 (0.175) (0.185) 
Ln(population) 0.822** 0.418 
 (0.364) (0.357) 
Urban population (%) 0.003 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%) -0.046* 0.003 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Ln(per capita expenditure) 0.370 0.176 
 (0.297) (0.252) 
Gini 1.625* 0.947 
 (0.872) (0.769) 
Poverty (%) -0.000 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP growth (%) 0.001 0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of instruments 17 17 
Sargan test: Chi squared 4.542 3.273 
Sargan test: P value 0.338 0.513 
Hansen test: Chi squared 7.594 5.736 
Hasen test: P value                                  0.108 0.220 
Test of AR(1): Z 1.320 1.134 
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 Victimisation rate All population Aged 7-18 
Test of AR(1): P value 0.187 0.257 
Test of weak IV: CLR 0.163 0.548 
Test of weak IV: CLR P value 0.95 0.872 
Test of weak IV: AR 7.19 6.342 
Test of weak IV: AR P value 0.304 0.386 
Number of districts 507 507 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard 
errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A20. Gender difference 
Victimisation rate  All population Female All population Male 
Lagged victim rate 0.109*** 0.099*** 0.117*** 0.125*** 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) 
Years of schooling, female aged 15+ -0.834*** -0.499*   
 (0.314) (0.299)   
Years of schooling, male aged 15+   -1.011** -1.383** 
   (0.413) (0.547) 
Year = 2009 -1.345*** -1.502*** -1.321*** -1.170*** 
 (0.112) (0.110) (0.120) (0.139) 
Year = 2010 -1.068*** -1.378*** -1.051*** -0.773*** 
 (0.205) (0.194) (0.219) (0.288) 
Year = 2011 -1.536*** -1.648*** -1.581*** -1.495*** 
 (0.154) (0.138) (0.149) (0.180) 
Year = 2012 -1.691*** -1.764*** -1.762*** -1.721*** 
 (0.191) (0.171) (0.180) (0.225) 
Ln(population) 1.060*** 0.863** 1.172*** 1.435** 
 (0.350) (0.353) (0.401) (0.564) 
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 Victimisation rate  All population Female All population Male 
Urban population (%) 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%) -0.006 -0.017 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) 
Ln(per capita expenditure) 0.650* 0.375 0.926** 1.241** 
 (0.338) (0.336) (0.416) (0.506) 
Gini 1.859** 1.326* 1.871** 2.156** 
 (0.873) (0.801) (0.880) (1.094) 
Poverty (%) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth (%) 0.004 0.005 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Number of instruments 17 17 17 17 
Sargan test: Chi squared 2.375 4.035 2.731 1.931 
Sargan test: P value 0.667 0.401 0.604 0.749 
Hansen test: Chi squared 2.060 3.788 3.305 1.531 
Hasen test: P value                                  0.725 0.435 0.508 0.821 
Test of AR(1): Z 0.144 0.635 0.507 0.152 
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 Victimisation rate  All population Female All population Male 
Test of AR(1): P value 0.885 0.525 0.612 0.879 
Test of weak IV: CLR 0.042 0.013 0.097 0.052 
Test of weak IV: CLR P value 0.982 0.997 0.965 0.978 
Test of weak IV: AR 2.037 3.64 3.07 1.571 
Test of weak IV: AR P value 0.916 0.725 0.8 0.955 
Number of districts 507 507 507 507 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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 Table A21. Interaction with poverty 
 5th percentile 10th percentile Poverty line 15th percentile 20th percentile 
Lagged victim rate 0.085*** 0.098*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.128*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.041) 
Year of school, aged 15+ -1.247*** -1.114*** -0.988*** -1.027*** -1.183*** 
 (0.452) (0.384) (0.369) (0.357) (0.425) 
Interaction 0.015* 0.007* 0.002 0.004 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Year = 2009 -1.354*** -1.347*** -1.322*** -1.331*** -1.261*** 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.114) (0.111) (0.137) 
Year = 2010 -1.273*** -1.255*** -1.032*** -1.184*** -1.002*** 
 (0.196) (0.177) (0.203) (0.167) (0.202) 
Year = 2011 -1.900*** -1.845*** -1.531*** -1.735*** -1.632*** 
 (0.209) (0.192) (0.147) (0.179) (0.166) 
Year = 2012 -2.202*** -2.139*** -1.689*** -1.995*** -1.856*** 
 (0.265) (0.246) (0.176) (0.227) (0.207) 
Ln(population) 1.127*** 1.125*** 1.090*** 1.077*** 1.236*** 
 (0.400) (0.379) (0.379) (0.374) (0.438) 
Urban population (%) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
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  5th percentile 10th percentile Poverty line 15th percentile 20th percentile 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male, aged 15-25 (%) 0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) 
Ln(per capita expenditure) 3.155** 2.581** 0.782** 1.975* 1.707* 
 (1.477) (1.215) (0.388) (1.088) (0.921) 
Gini -3.781 -2.193 1.716* -0.742 0.968 
 (3.384) (2.626) (0.892) (2.245) (1.326) 
Poverty (%) 0.002 0.002 -0.019 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth (%) 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of instruments 20 20 20 20 20 
Sargan test: Chi squared 1.182 0.896 2.487 0.837 2.087 
Sargan test: P value 0.978 0.989 0.870 0.991 0.911 
Hansen test: Chi squared 1.856 1.715 3.501 2.163 4.317 
Hasen test: P value                                  0.932 0.944 0.744 0.904 0.634 
Test of AR(1): Z -0.504 -0.099 0.255 0.276 0.222 
Test of AR(1): P value 0.615 0.921 0.799 0.783 0.824 
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  5th percentile 10th percentile Poverty line 15th percentile 20th percentile 
Test of weak IV: CLR 1.443 0.916 0.36 4.526 0.673 
Test of weak IV: CLR P value 0.772 0.866 0.97 0.29 0.921 
Test of weak IV: AR 3.253 2.663 3.675 6.581 4.284 
Test of weak IV: AR P value 0.953 0.976 0.931 0.681 0.892 
Number of districts 507 507 507 507 507 
Number of observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Notes: Data sources: Susenas, DAPOER, MoF; Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%; Standard errors are in parentheses 
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